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1. Introduction
Utility functions are characterized in three dimensions, reflecting preferences over goods,
time and uncertainty. The utility function conventionally characterizes preferences over goods
defined by a time period and a state of nature, preferences over the temporal allocation of goods,
and preferences over outcomes as realizations of uncertain states of nature.  This broad
characterization includes most alternatives to conventional expected utility theory.
1  We focus on the
utility function for money, collapsing the choice over goods down to just one good so that there is
no choice option with respect to goods.
2 We use controlled experiments with field subjects in
Denmark to elicit individuals’ risk and time preferences.
Information on risk and time preferences is of obvious value for policy, theory and empirical
analysis generally.  Policy applications include cost-benefit analysis of government programs, which
often require welfare calculations to be made over uncertain projects whose impacts are spread over
time.  Theoretical applications include tests of propositions about the relationship between risk and
time preferences and the consistency of time preferences.
3 Empirical applications include the study
of savings behavior, insurance decisions, and asset prices.
4 A better characterization of risk and time
preferences can therefore be of considerable value.
We evaluate a new field methodology developed to elicit both time and risk preferences
from the same respondents.  We use relatively simple experimental procedures that have evolved in
the recent literature to study each.  Indeed, all of the basic procedures we use have been applied and
evaluated in laboratory experiments, albeit separately for the elicitation of risk and time preferences. 5 Phase 1 of the project involved the field experiments described here, to elicit information on risk
and time preferences.  Phase 2 will involve complementary laboratory experiments to assess variations in the
experimental design that would be too expensive to evaluate in the field.  Phase 3 will involve re-visiting the
subject from Phase 1, to generate a panel of data on elicited preferences.
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This is deliberate, and illustrates the complementarity of lab and field experiments.  These
experimental procedures are presented in Section 2: we build on the risk aversion experiments of
Holt and Laury [2002] (HL) and the discount rate experiments of Coller and Williams [1999] (CW),
Harrison, Lau and Williams [2002] (HLW) and Coller, Harrison and Rutström [2002] (CHR).  Our
design is implemented in the field in Denmark, to obtain a sample that offers a wider range of
individual socio-demographic characteristics than usually found in subject pools recruited in
colleges, as well as a sample that can be used to make inferences about the preferences of the adult
population of Denmark.
Many of the features of our design were selected to make the experimental task as
transparent to the field subjects as possible, and we devote considerable attention to those design
issues in section 3.  Our goal is also to propose a general experimental design that can be applied,
with obvious modifications, in other countries. Results from the first phase of our experiments
5 are
presented in section 4, and conclusions drawn in section 5.  We focus primarily on the
methodological issues, but also present some general findings.
 We find that adult Danes are generally risk averse over the domains considered here, and
that very few exhibit any risk-loving behavior.  We estimate average individual discount rates to be
23.1%, roughly 5 to 10 percentage points lower than directly comparable studies.  Discount rates for
the shortest horizon of one month do appear to be higher than for the longer horizons, extending
up to 24 months, but only by about 2 to 3 percentage points.  Risk and time preferences are
heterogeneous, varying by observable individual characteristics. On a methodological level, we
implement a refinement of existing procedures which elicits much more precise estimates, and also
mitigates framing effects.6 The MPL appears to have been first used in pricing experiments by Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler
[1990], and has been adopted in recent discount rate experiments by Coller and Williams [1999]. It has a
longer history in the elicitation of hypothetical valuation responses in “contingent valuation” survey settings,
as discussed by Mitchell and Carson [1989; p. 100, fn. 14]. The test devised by HL is closely related to one
developed by Murnighan, Roth and Schoumaker [1988] to measure the degree of risk aversion of subjects in
bargaining experiments.
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2. General Experimental Procedures for Eliciting Risk and Time Preferences
Many of the experimental procedures used in this study have been previously studied. In this
section we summarize these procedures, and discuss the important factors that lead to specific
design choices in our field experiments.
A. Risk Preferences: Measuring Risk Aversion
Holt and Laury [2002] (HL) devise a simple experimental measure for risk aversion using a
multiple price list (MPL) design.
6 Each subject is presented with a choice between two lotteries,
which we can call A or B. Table 1 illustrates the basic payoff matrix presented to subjects. The first
row shows that lottery A offered a 10% chance of receiving $2 and a 90% chance of receiving $1.60.
The expected value of this lottery, EV
A, is shown in the third-last column as $1.64, although the EV
columns were not presented to subjects.  Similarly, lottery B in the first row has chances of payoffs
of $3.85 and $0.10, for an expected value of $0.48. Thus the two lotteries have a relatively large
difference in expected values, in this case $1.17. As one proceeds down the matrix, the expected
value of both lotteries increases, but the expected value of lottery B becomes greater than the
expected value of lottery A.
The subject chooses A or B in each row, and one row is later selected at random for payout
for that subject. The logic behind this test for risk aversion is that only risk-loving subjects would
take lottery B in the first row, and only risk-averse subjects would take lottery A in the second last
row. Arguably, the last row is simply a test that the subject understood the instructions, and has no
relevance for risk aversion at all. A risk neutral subject should switch from choosing A to B when
the EV of each is about the same, so a risk-neutral subject would choose A for the first four rows7 Some subjects switched several times, but the minimum switch point is always well-defined. It turns
out not to make much difference how one handles these “multiple switch” subjects, but our analysis and the
analysis of HL consider the effect of accounting for them in different ways explained below.
8 HL also utilize a variant of the Expo-Power utility function proposed by Saha [1993], which is more
general than the CRRA characterization. The Expo-Power function is defined as  u(y) = [1-exp(-"y
1-r)]/",
where y is income and " and r are parameters to be estimated.  relative risk aversion (RRA) is then r + "(1-
r)y
1-r.  So RRA varies with income if " … 0. This function nests CRRA (as " tends to 0) and CARA (as r tends
to 0). HL estimate this function assuming that every subject has the same risk preference. They rely on a
“noise parameter” to accommodate the obvious differences in risk choices across subjects, but do not allow
risk preferences to vary with observable socio-demographic characteristics as we do later.  It is beyond the
scope of this exercise to compare alternative specifications of the utility function.
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and B thereafter.
These data may be analyzed using a variety of statistical models. Each subject made 10
responses.  The responses can be reduced to a scalar if one looks at the lowest row in Table 1 at
which the subject “switched” over from lottery A to lottery B.
7  This reduces the response to a scalar
for each subject and task, but a scalar that takes on integer values between 0 and 10. Alternatively,
one could study the effects of experimental conditions in terms of the constant relative risk aversion
(CRRA) characterization, employing an interval regression model. The dependant variable is the
CRRA interval that subjects implicitly choose when they switch from lottery A to lottery B. For each
row of panel A in Table 1, one can calculate the implied bounds on the CRRA coefficient, and these
are in fact reported by HL [2002; Table 3].  These intervals are shown in the final column of Table 1. 
Thus, for example, a subject that made 5 safe choices and then switched to the risky alternatives
would have revealed a CRRA interval between 0.14 and 0.41, and a subject that made 7 safe choices
would have revealed a CRRA interval between 0.68 and 0.97, and so on.
8
In this study we expand the HL design, with some simple modifications to allow a richer
characterization of the utility function. The HL design called for each subject to be given choices
over four lottery prizes and for there to be one major scale change for all real payoffs. We also want
to allow for changes in the value of prizes, so that we have data for the same subject over more than
four prizes and can generate better characterizations of their risk attitudes.
The main design issue is whether we want to generate enough choices for each individual to
be able to estimate a utility function for that individual, as in Hey and Orme [1992]. The alternatives9 We can estimate flexible function forms such as Expo-Power, which allow for non-CRRA behavior.
10 The second set generates CRRA values of -1.45, -0.72, -0.25, 0.13, 0.47, 0.80, 1.16, 1.59 and 2.21;
the third set generates values of -1.84, -1.101, -0.52, -0.14, 0.17, 0.46, 0.75, 1.07 and 1.51; and the fourth set
generates values of -0.75, -0.32, -0.05, 0.16, 0.34, 0.52, 0.70, 0.91 and 1.20.
-5-
are to restrict our analysis to the switch-point intervals of the individual, which define high and low
CRRA intervals, or to estimate a utility function
9 for the sample and predict the individual’s risk
attitudes from that. The only problem with the latter approach is that we are assuming that the
observed characteristics of the individual adequately characterize the individual’s risk attitudes.
We  undertake four separate risk aversion tasks with each subject, each with different prizes
designed so that all 16 prizes span the range of income that we seek to estimate risk aversion over.
Ideally, we would have a roughly even span of prizes so that we can evaluate the utility function for
the individual at different income levels and know that there were some response at or near that
level. The four sets of prizes are as follows, with the two prizes for lottery A listed first and the two
prizes for lottery B listed next: (A1: 2000 DKK, 1600 DKK; B1: 3850 DKK, 100 DKK), (A2: 2250
DKK, 1500 DKK; B2: 4000 DKK, 500 DKK), (A3: 2000 DKK, 1750 DKK; B3: 4000 DKK, 150
DKK), and (A4: 2500 DKK, 1000 DKK; B4: 4500 DKK, 50 DKK). At the time of the first phase
of the experiments, the exchange rate was approximately 6.55 DKK per U.S. dollar, so these prizes
range from approximately $7.65 to $687.
This set of prizes generates an array of possible CRRA values.  For example set 1 generates
CRRA intervals at the switch points of -1.71, -0.95, -0.49, -0.14, 0.15, 0.41, 0.68, 0.97 and 1.37.  The
other sets generate different CRRA intervals, such that all four sets span 36 distinct CRRA values
between -1.84 and 2.21, with roughly 60% of the CRRA values reflecting risk aversion.
10 Any scaling
of the prizes that is common within a set will preserve the implied CRRA coefficients, so this design
can also be used in laboratory settings with smaller or larger payoffs.
We ask the subject to respond to all four risk aversion tasks and then randomly decide which
one to play out. In addition, the large incentives and budget constraints precluded paying all
subjects, so each subject is given a 10% chance to actually receive the payment associated with his11 HLW chose one subject at random to receive payment, but the probability of being selected
depended on group sizes, which varied slightly.  This procedures ensures comparability of incentives across




B. Time Preferences: Measuring Individual Discount Rates
The basic experimental design for eliciting individual discount rates (IDRs) was introduced
in CW and expanded in HLW and CHR.  The basic question asked of subjects is extremely simple:
do you prefer $100 today or $100+x tomorrow, where x is some positive amount?  If the subject
prefers the $100 today then we can infer that the discount rate is higher than x% per day; otherwise,
we can infer that it is x% per day or less.  The format of the CW and HLW experiments modified
and extended this basic question in six ways.
First, we pose a number of such questions to each individual, each question varying x by
some amount. When x is zero we would obviously expect the individual to reject the option of
waiting for no rate of return.  As we increase x we would expect more individuals to take the future
income option.  For any given individual, the point at which they switch from choosing the current
income option to taking the future income option provides a bound on their discount rate.  That is,
if an individual takes the current income option for all x from 0 to 10, then takes the future income
option for all x from 11 up to 100, we can infer that their discount rate lies between 10% and 11%
for this time interval.  The finer the increments in x, the finer will we be able to pinpoint the
discount rate of the individual.
Second, the experimental task used an MPL format, simultaneously posing several questions
with varying values of x. After all questions had been completed by the individual, one of the
questions was chosen at random for actual payment.  In this way the results from one question do
not generate income effects which might influence the answers to other questions.  This feature of
the design mimics the format used by HL in their risk aversion experiments: in that case the rows
reflected different probabilities of each prize, and in this case the rows reflect different annual12 We exploit this similarity of format in the design of our computerized interface to subjects, and in
the use of trainers in the risk aversion task as a generic substitute for trainers in the discount rate task.
13  Including the possibility of default by the experimenter.
14  To explain the censoring problem, assume that you value a cold beer at $3, which is to say that if
you had to pay $3 for one beer you would.  If I ask you whether or not you are willing to pay $2.50 for a lab
beer, your response to me will depend on whether or not there is a market price of field beer (assumed to be
the same as the lab beer) lower than $2.50.  If the market price of the field beer is $2.00, and you know that
you can buy a beer outside the lab at this price, then you would never rationally reveal to me that you would
pay $2.50 for my lab beer.  In this case we say that your response is censored by the market price (Harrison
[1992; p.1432]).  CW and HLW discuss procedures for handling censored responses in the context of
discount rate elicitation.
15 CW suggest that behavior in previous studies may be affected by uncontrolled factors other than
time preferences that may help explain observed anomalies. They suggest that subjects may attempt to arbitrage
between lab and field investment opportunities, but may make mistakes in comparing these opportunities
because the lab and field investments are “priced” in different terms. Lab investments are priced in dollar
interest (the difference between the early and later payments), while field investments are priced in terms of
annual and effective interest rates. A rational subject should never choose to postpone payment in the
laboratory at interest rates lower than those she can receive in the external market, for example, but she may
make mistakes in converting dollar interest to an interest rate (or vice versa) for the purposes of comparison.
The use of hypothetical or small payments is likely to exacerbate this problem because of the cognitive costs
associated with the subject’s arbitrage problem; at lower stakes subjects are likely to expend less cognitive
effort on getting the comparison right.
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effective rates of return.
12
Third, subjects are provided two future income options rather than one “instant income”
option and one future income option.  For example, they might be offered $100 in one month and
$100+x in 7 months, so that we interpret the revealed discount rate as applying to a time horizon of
6 months.  This avoids the potential problem of the subject facing extra transactions costs
13 with the
future income option.  If the delayed option were to involve greater transactions costs, then the
revealed discount rate would include these subjective transactions costs.  By having both options
entail future income we hold these transactions costs constant.
Fourth, subjects were asked to provide information to help identify what market rates of
interest they face.  This information was used to allow for the possibility that their responses in the
discount rate task are censored by market rates.
14
Fifth,  respondents were provided with the interest rates associated with the delayed payment
option. This is an important control feature if field investments are priced in terms of interest rates.
If subjects are attempting to compare the lab investment to their field options, this feature may serve
to reduce comparison errors since now both lab and field options are priced in the same metric.
1516 We are grateful to Sydbank for administrative assistance with the money transfers.
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Sixth, while CW examined a 6-month time horizon only,  HLW analyzed questions of time-
consistent preferences by eliciting discount rates for four time horizons: 6 months, 12 months, 24
months, and 36 months.  Some subjects were randomly assigned a single time horizon, while others
were asked to state their preferences for each of the four time horizons, allowing for a test of the
effect of asking subjects to consider multiple time horizons.
Subjects in the HLW experiments were given payoff tables such as the one illustrated in
Table 2.  They were told that they must choose between payment Options A and B for each of the
20 payoff alternatives. Option A was 3000 DKK in all sessions. Option B paid 3000 DKK + X
DKK, where X ranged from annual rates of return of 2.5% to 50% on the principal of 3000 DKK,
compounded quarterly to be consistent with general Danish banking practices on overdraft
accounts. The payoff tables provided the annual and annual effective interest rates for each payment
option and the experimental instructions defined these terms by way of example.
Across all time horizons considered by HLW, payoffs to any one subject could range from
3,000 DKK up to 12,333 DKK.  The exchange rate when the HLW experiments were conducted in
mid-1997 was approximately 6.7 DKK per US dollar, so this range converts to $450 and $1,840.
The design used in this study essentially follows the multiple-horizon treatment of HLW.
The only variations from the perspective of the task faced by the subjects is that the instrument is
now computerized, and subjects are presented with 6 discount rate tasks, corresponding to 6
different time horizons: 1 month, 4 months, 6 months, 12 months, 18 months, and 24 months.
In addition, there are some minor changes in payment procedures. In the HLW experiments,
a certificate for future payment was guaranteed by the Social Research Institute (SFI) , which was
redeemable on the payment date for an SFI-issued check.  In these new experiments, future
payments are guaranteed by the Danish Ministry of Economic and Business Affairs, and made by
automatic transfer from the Ministry’s bank account to the subject’s bank account.
16  This payment
procedure is similar to a post-dated check, and automatic transfers between bank accounts are a17 For example, Hey and Dardanoni [1988] and Harrison and Morgan [1990].
18  AGGS are able to effect delayed payments by distributing post-dated checks the day of the
experiment, thereby eliminating any differences between immediate and delayed payments due to subject
expectations regarding the credibility of future payments. This is a very desirable design feature that is not
available to us, as Danish banks do not honor date restrictions on checks.
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common procedure in Denmark. We conjecture that this feature will reduce transaction costs and
credibility issues associated with future payments. Finally, while CW and HLW randomly select a
single “Assignee” from the group of subjects in a given session to actually receive the payment
associated with his decision, in these new experiments each subject is given a 10% chance to receive
actual payment. As subjects completed a total of 10 tasks, consisting of 4 risk aversion choice and 6
discount rate choices, subjects on average received actual payment for 1 task.
C.  Related Literature
Although there have been several experimental studies examining inter-temporal allocations
under uncertainty,
17 only two address the elicitation of risk and time preferences directly using
procedures familiar to experimental economists.
Anderhub, Güth, Gneezy and Sonsino [2001] (AGGS) use the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak
(BDM) procedure to elicit certainty equivalents for lotteries with varied payoff dates.  They used
undergraduate economic students in Israel as subjects.  Each subject provided either a buying or a
selling price for each of three lotteries that paid out the day of the experiment, two weeks from the
day of experiment, and four weeks from the day of the experiment. The lotteries differ only with
respect to the timing of payments.
18 One decision was chosen at random to be played out. AGGS
find no statistical difference between certainty equivalents across different time horizons. They find
a marginally significant negative relationship between the degree of risk aversion and the discount
rates implied by the timing of payments. 
The differences between the elicitation tasks in our design and that of AGGS reflect a
tradeoff between compactness of experimental procedures and transparency of the task required of
subjects. While our elicitation mechanism is logically equivalent to the BDM, we believe the binary19 Payments for investment in education of a family member or own retirement were effected by 5-
year or 7-year Certificate of Deposit. Payments for own education were given as reimbursements for
“admission fees at an educational institution (professional, collegial, or university), purchases of didactic
material (books, software, or others).”
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decisions in the MPL task are less of a cognitive burden for subjects. Moreover, the AGGS design
elicits a single value from subjects that reflects both risk and time preferences, while we prefer to
examine these preferences separately.
Eckel, Johnson and Montmarquette [2002] (EJM) conduct a field study of time and risk
preferences. Their subjects are recruited from low income neighborhoods in Montreal. Subjects in
these experiments are given 64 “compensated” questions, one of which is chosen at random for
payment. Time preferences are elicited by presenting subjects with choices between payoffs that
occur at different times. Time horizons for the later payments ranged from 2 days to 28 days, and
most early payments had a front end delay of one day, one week, or two weeks.  The value for most
questions started at approximately $72 CAD, with a few questions presenting values around $26
CAD. The distribution of annual discount rates implied by the questions was lumpy, with values of
10%, 50%, 200% and 380%. 
Risk preferences are elicited by presenting subjects with choices between lotteries, where
most choices involved a “less risky” lottery that paid a single amount with certainty. The expected
value of the lotteries ranged from $40 CAD to $120 CAD. 
EJM also examine preferences toward investing in the future (i.e., in own education, in the
education of a family member, or in own retirement) by presenting subjects with a series of
questions of the form “Do you prefer $X in one week or $X + $Y in educational expenses to be
reimbursed over the next year.” In a series of questions of this kind, Y varied from a one-to-one
match with X, to a five-to-one match with X. It was not possible for EJM to ensure that funds were
used for the purposes stated in the question, however, so it is not clear whether these choices
represented the actual investment suggested to subjects, or whether they were simply a choice
between “money earlier or more money later.”
19 Since the time horizons for the own education-11-
questions are unspecified (though constrained to fall within one year of the experiment), it is not
possible to calculate a range of discount rates implied by these tradeoffs. The lowest possible
discount rate is approximately 29%, implied by the decision to take $600 in 7 years instead of $100
in a week.  From there the rates increase to several hundred percent.
 The questionnaire design in EJM is equivalent to an MPL in which the values are arranged
in random order, rather than monotonically with respect to the parameters of the experiment.
Although subjects report they had access to credit market instruments, there is no attempt to control
for censoring behavior.
Four of the 37 time preference choices had no front-end delay. EJM find mixed statistical
evidence that the presence of a front end delay affects the likelihood of choosing the later payment.
Moreover, EJM manipulate the length of the front end delay and find no effect on implied discount
rates.
EJM find some socio-economic characteristics that affect time preferences. In the analysis of
the small payment questions, women, students, and older people appear to be more patient, and low
income individuals appear to be less patient. In the analysis of the large payment questions, when the
later payment is for the individual, older individuals and more risk-averse individuals are more likely
to take the earlier cash payment. Level of education has a positive impact on the probability of
choosing the delayed payment when framed as an investment in education. Subjects with children
are more likely to choose the later payment when it is framed as an investment in the education of a
family member, but educated males are less likely to do so. 
EJM do not find risk attitudes to vary by subject characteristics, though their analysis does
not indicate that they controlled for the age of subjects. 20 In the original context, expenditures could never be negative.
21 Although CW constructed the likelihood function for the interval-censored regression model “by
hand” using LIMDEP, it is now a standard option in popular statistical packages including the latest version
of LIMDEP. For example, Stata has an official command INTREG to estimate these models, including
variants for complex survey data (SVYINTREG) and panel data (XTINTREG).  There is also a user-written
command, INTREG2, for multiplicative heteroskedasticity specifications.
22 See Harrison [1992].
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3.  New Methodological Issues
A. The Iterative Multiple Price List
The MPL as employed by CW, HLW, CHR and HL has three possible disadvantages. The
first is that it only elicits interval responses, rather than “point” valuations. The second is that some
subjects can switch back and forth between (lottery or payment option) A and B as they move down
the MPL, implying inconsistent preferences when values are listed by order of magnitude. The third
is that it could be susceptible to framing effects, as subjects are drawn to the middle of the ordered
table irrespective of their true values. We propose extensions of the basic MPL approach which can
address each.
Interval Responses
The problem of interval responses can be addressed in two ways.
The first is simply to use statistical methods that recognize that the response is interval-
censored. These methods are an extension of traditional Tobit models, which recognize that a
dependant variable may be right or left censored at some fixed value.
20 Tobit models can be
extended to allow for right or left censoring that varies with the subject. A further extension allows
each subject’s response to be left-censored and right-censored, which is just another way of saying
that the subject’s response is interval-censored. This is the statistical approach used by CW,  HLW
and CHR for discount rate applications, and Harrison, Johnson, McInnes and Rutström
[2003a][2003b] for risk aversion applications.
21  Since there is some controversy over the ability to
elicit precise valuations using methods that elicit a point response,
22 it could be that the best one can
do anyway is elicit interval responses. For now, we remain agnostic on this issue, although the23 If the subject always chooses A, or indicates Indifference for any of the decision rows, there are no
additional decisions required and the task is completed.
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experiments we undertake can help us address the issue empirically.
The second way to address the interval response issue is to extend the MPL to allow more
refined elicitation of the true valuation. We do so, in the form of a computerized variant on the basic
MPL format which we call an Iterative MPL (iMPL). Consider three MPL designs:
# MPL – this is the standard format in which the subject sees a fixed array of paired options
and chooses one for each row. It allows subjects to switch back and forth as they like, and
has already been used in many experiments.
# sMPL – Switching MPL varies the standard MPL by asking the subject to simply choose the
row at which he wants to first switch from option A to option B, assuming monotonicity of
the underlying preferences to fill out the remaining choices. This is an important behavioral
bridge to the Iterative MPL below, since the latter implicitly assumes such behavior. In all
other respects the sMPL looks just like the standard MPL.
# iMPL – The iterative MPL extends the Switching MPL to allow the individual to make
choices from refined options within the option last chosen. That is, if someone decides at
some stage to switch from option A to option B between values of $10 and $20, the next
stage of an iMPL would then prompt the subject to make more choices within this interval,
to refine the values elicited.
23 Figures 1 and 2 illustrate Level 1 and Level 2, respectively, of
an iMPL for a discount rate task.  In Level 1 the illustrative subject first chooses B when the
interest rate is between 25% and 30%, so that Level 2 presents the subject with 11 more
choices within the interval 25% to 30%. The format naturally has some “smarts” built into it:
when the values being elicited drop to some specified perceptive threshold (e.g., 10 cents in a
pricing task, 0.05 of a percentage point of AR in the discount rate task, and a 1-in-100 die
throw in the risk aversion task), the iMPL collapses down to an endogenous number of final
rows. When the threshold is met at this minimal interval, the program stops iterating.24 Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutström [2003] examine these three institutions in controlled
laboratory experiments with college students. The sMPL is implemented because the iMPL changes the
decision in two ways: forcing a single switch point in each table, and refining the choice. By comparing MPL
and sMPL we can see the pure effect of the first change, and the by comparing sMPL and iMPL we can see
the pure effect of the second change.
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The iMPL uses the same incentive logic as the MPL and sMPL. After making all responses, the
subject has one row from the first table selected at random by the experimenter. In the MPL and
sMPL, that is all there is. In the iMPL, that is all there is if the row selected at random by the
experimenter is not the one that the subject switched at in Level 1. If it is the row that the subject
switched at, another random draw is made to pick a row in the Level 2 table, and so on.
We utilize the iMPL since it provides more refined responses and does not appear to
otherwise affect the response.  We are also able to undertake some qualified tests of the iMPL
procedure by comparing responses at the initial Level 1 step with responses at the final step.  This is
not the same as the subject only facing an MPL design, but it provides some behavioral check on the
new procedure.
24 We use the iMPL both for the risk tasks and the discount rate tasks.
Multiple Switch Points
The problem here is that some subjects switch back and forth as they move down the rows
of the MPL.  Few of the existing MPL implementations allow subjects to report indifference. It is
quite possible that switching behavior is the result of the subject being indifferent between the
options. The implication here is that one could simply use a “fatter” interval to represent this
subject, defined by the first row that the subject switched at and the last row that the subject
switched at.
Our use of the iMPL removes the possibility that subjects can switch back and forth, since
we ask them to just state a single switch point.  Nevertheless, we also include an explicit indifference
option. Hence we allow subjects in the first stage of the iMPL to state if they prefer option A, prefer
option B, or if they do not care. The computerized interface handles this possibility in a manner that
is consistent with there still being one switch point.25 Harrison, Harstad and Rutström [2002] examine the ways in which such information could impact
elicited valuations.
26 A parallel issue arises in the use of incentive-compatible auction institutions to elicit valuations for
private goods.  One might be interested in testing if subjects behave as if they understand that truthfully
revealing their valuation is in their best interest, or one might be interested in using that feature of the
institution to encourage truthful revelation.  In the latter case it would be appropriate to tell subjects the
(correct) logic underlying the incentive-compatibility of the institution, but that would obviously be an
unfortunate design choice in the former case.
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Framing Effects
A natural concern with the MPL is that is might encourage subjects to pick a response in the
middle of the table, independent of true valuations. There could be a psychological bias towards the
middle, although that is far from obvious a priori. More to the point in a valuation setting, the use of
specific values at either end of the table could signal to the subject that the experimenter believes
that these are reasonable upper and lower bounds.
25 In some tasks, such as the risk elicitation task of
Holt and Laury [2002], the values are bounded by the laws of probability between 0 and 1, so this is
less likely to be a factor compared to the pure psychological anchor of the middle row.
One solution to this task which we find unattractive is to randomize the order of the rows.
This is popular in some experimental studies in psychology which elicited discount rates, such as
Kirby and Marakoviƒ [1996] and Kirby, Petry and Bickel [1999].  We find it unattractive for two
reasons. First, if there is a purely psychological anchoring effect towards the middle, this will do
nothing but add noise to the responses. Second, the valuation task is fundamentally harder from a
cognitive perspective if one shuffles the order of valuations across rows.  This harder task may be
worthy of study, but is a needless confound for our inferential purposes.
26
Framing effects can be relatively easily tested for by varying the cardinal scale of the basic
MPL table, or by varying the number of intervals within a given cardinal range. If there is an effect
on responses, it will be easy to identify statistically and then to correct for it in the data analysis. We
would not be surprised to find framing effects of this kind. They do not necessarily indicate a failure
of the traditional economic model, so much as a need to recognize that subjects in a lab setting uses27 See Harrison, Harstad and Rutström [2002] for a general discussion of the various ways in which
such information might impact elicited valuations.  CHR discuss the use of a front end delay in discount rate
experiments in this manner: the absence of a front end delay representing a choice between a “good apple
today” and a “bad apple in a week,” where the goodness of the apple refers to the probability of actually being
paid.  In such a frame, it is not clear if the subject is responding to the time delay or the quality of the apple.
The psychological literature provides evidence of the effects of framing, such as in the “more is less” setting
in which subjects appear to be willing to pay less money for more of the good (e.g., Hsee, Loewenstein, Blount
and Bazerman [1999]).  For example, List [2002] offers subjects 10 high-quality sportscards in one treatment,
and the same 10 high-quality sportscards plus 3 poor-quality sportscards in another treatment.  When valuing
these separately, subjects tend to value the second set lower than the first, but when valuing them jointly, they
value the second set equal to or higher than the first set.  Arguably, the inclusion of 3 poor-quality cards
makes the subject wary that there might be quality vagaries in all cards, such that this choice is framed by the
subjects as “10 good apples” and “13 good or bad apples” rather than “10 good apples” and “10 good apples,
and some apples I can toss or use for cooking.”
28  The skewed frames will affect the implementation of the iMPL. In the symmetric frame, all
intervals are 10 probability points wide, so that a second level is all that is needed to bring subject choices
down to precise intervals of 1 probability point. In the skewed frames, however, because the intervals vary in
size, a third level is required to bring choices down to this level of precision, and the number of decision rows
in Level 3 depends on the width of the interval in Level 1 at which the subject switches.
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all available information to identify a good valuation for a commodity.
27 Thus it is critical to be able
to estimate the quantitative effect of certain frames and then allow for them in subsequent statistical
analysis.
We devise a test for framing effects by varying the cardinal scale of the MPL used in the risk
aversion task. Two asymmetric frames are developed: the skewHI treatment offers initial probabilities
of (0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9 and 1), while skewLO offers initial probabilities of (0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, and
1).  This treatment yields 6 decision rows in Level 1 of the iMPL, as opposed to the 10 rows in the
symmetric frame.
28 The distribution of frame treatments across sessions is detailed in an appendix
documenting the sample design.
B. Complementary Laboratory Experiments
It is too costly to examine every possible variant of an experimental design such as ours in
the field.  Sample sizes in cells would become too low for any reliable statistical inferences.  Hence,
in an extension of the work presented here, we will exploit the complementarity of the laboratory
and the field to assess the behavioral effects of design variations.
One issue is the performance of the iMPL institution compared to the traditional MPL29 See Cox and Sadiraj [2001], Harrison, Johnson, McInnes and Rutström [2003], Rabin [2000], Rabin
and Thaler [2002] and Rubinstein [2002] for discussion of these debates.  Of course, these are older issues: see
Markowitz [1952], Samuelson [1952; ¶13, p.676] and Quizon, Binswanger and Machina [1984].
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institution.  In this case we propose examination of the MPL, sMPL and iMPL institutions, with
subjects assigned randomly to each.  Since framing is a potentially important confound, and could
plausibly vary with the use MPL and iMPL, we will interact the two asymmetric treatments described
above with the type of MPL institution.  Including controls, this implies a 3 × 3 design for each
elicitation task. Each such design would be implemented for IDR tasks and RA tasks separately, so
that we then have a 2 × 3 × 3 design.
Because there are important debates over whether EUT is appropriately defined over lab
income, lifetime income, lifetime wealth, or non-additive components of lifetime wealth,
29 we also
propose one intra-session treatment: the variation of initial endowments that the subject receives. 
All subjects would receive the same initial show-up fee.  In addition, following Rutström [1998], we
would then augment that amount at random and privately.  Thus we can begin the assessment of how
the elicited risk and time preferences depend on initial wealth, even if this only refers to “lab
wealth.”
C. Panel Experiments
The first phase of our experimental design involved eliciting risk attitudes and discount rates
for a large sample.  The final phase will involve re-visiting these subjects in the future, and re-
estimating the same risk and time preferences. 
The timing of the later session, and the choice of time horizons for the discount rate task,
are picked to allow an in-sample test of the dynamic consistency issue addressed in the between-subjects
experimental designs by HLW and CHR. Several studies, including HLW and CHR,  have examined
the issue of dynamic consistency by testing whether discount rates elicited at a given point in time
are consistent across different time horizons. Our panel experiments, however, will also allow for a
direct test of whether individuals tend to reverse their preferences as future rewards become more-18-
proximate, as suggested by Strotz [1956].  Let T represent the time horizons given to subjects in the
first stage. Then the second stage will provide the same tasks and same monetary incentives to
subjects at t months after the first stage, but with new time horizons of T-t. If preferences are
dynamically consistent, the subject will reveal the same discount rate for horizon T-t in the second
stage as he did for horizon T in the first stage. 
We will also use the second stage of risk aversion experiments to test whether risk
preferences are stable over time. Moreover, in both stages we collect the same information on socio-
demographic characteristics, financial market activities, and subjects’ expectations about their future
economic conditions and their own future financial position. With this information we can check to
see if any of the “states” defining the household have changed, so that we can determine if state-
dependant preferences are stable over time. 
 
4. Conducting the Experiments in the Field
A. Sampling Procedures
The sample for the field experiments was designed to generate a representative sample of the
adult Danish population. HLW relied on the sample frames developed by the SFI for their sample,
and also used SFI personnel to conduct the field experiments.  Given the substantial cost of using
such survey firms, and the desire to have more control over this aspect of the field experiment, we
decided to undertake the sampling and experiments ourselves. There were six steps in the
construction of the sample, with further details provided in an appendix:
• First, a random sample of 25,000 Danes was drawn from the Danish Civil Registration
Office in January 2003.  Only Danes born between 1927 and 1983 were included, thereby
restricting the age range of the target population to between 19 and 75.  For each person in
this random sample we had access to their name, address, county, municipality, birth date,
and sex. Due to the absence of names and/or addresses, 28 of these records were discarded.
• Second, we discarded 17 municipalities (including one county) from the population, due to30  The initial letter of invitation included an answer form and a prepaid envelope, and the subject was
asked to answer within one week.  The same day we received the answer form, a reply letter was sent
confirming their participation in the meeting at the given location, date and time.  Every recruited subject was
reminded by mail or phone within a week of the meeting.  Both procedures were used for the first three
sessions, and attendance was almost 100% at these sessions.  We reminded subjects by mail for the remaining
sessions because this procedure is more convenient.
31 An additional 45 and 19 invitations were sent out in the second and third wave, respectively. The
first wave of invitations were sent out four weeks before the first session was scheduled, and we asked people
to reply within one week.  The second and third waves of invitations were sent out two and three weeks after
the first wave, respectively.
32  The response rate was 42.5% for the first wave, 20.0% percent for the second wave, and 22.1%
for the third wave.
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them being located in extraordinarily remote locations.  The population represented in these
locations amounts to less than 2% of the Danish population, or 493 individuals in our
sample from the civil registry.
• Third, we assigned each county either 1 session or 2 sessions, in rough proportionality to the
population of the county.  In total we assigned 20 sessions.  Each session consisted of two
sub-sessions at the same locale and date, one at 5pm and another at 8pm, and subjects were
allowed to choose which sub-session suited them best.
• Fourth, we divided 6 counties into two sub-groups because the distance between some
municipalities in the county and the location of the session would be too large.  A random
draw was made between the two sub-groups and the location selected, where the weights
reflect the relative size of the population in September 2002. 
• Fifth, we picked the first 30 or 60 randomly sorted records within each county, depending
on the number of sessions allocated to that county.  This provided a sub-sample of 600.
• Sixth, we mailed invitations to attend a session to the sub-sample of 600, offering each
person a choice of times for the session.
30  Response rates were low in some counties, so
another 64 invitations were mailed out in these counties to newly drawn subjects.
31 Everyone
that gave a positive response was assigned to a session, and our recruited sample was 268.
32 
These procedures generally followed those used earlier by HLW.
Attendance at the experimental sessions was extraordinarily high, including 4 persons who
did not respond to the letter of invitation but showed up unexpectedly and participated in the33 The first person suffered from dementia and could not remember the instructions; the second
person was a 76 year old woman who was not able to control the mouse and eventually gave up; the third
person had just won a world championship in sailing and was too busy with interviews to stay for two hours;
and the fourth person was sent home because too many people showed up (one person came unexpected, and
we had only ten laptops available at that session).
34 Certain events might have plausibly triggered some of the no-shows: for example, 3 men did not
turn up on June 11, 2003, but that was the night that the Danish national soccer team played a qualifying
game for the European championships against Luxembourg that was not scheduled when we picked session
dates.
35  Counties 30 and 35 were aggregated, due to smaller samples, as were counties 65 and 76.  These
are each relatively similar areas in Denmark.
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experiment.  Four persons turned up for their session, but were not able to participate in the
experiments.
33  The experiments were conducted between June 2 and June 24, 2003, and a total of
253 subjects participated in the experiments.
34  Table 3 summarizes population shares by county,
distribution of sessions across counties, and final sample frequencies. 
Sample weights for the experiments subjects can be constructed using the sample design.
Table 4 contains the information needed to see how these were constructed. The population was
broken down by county, age group, and sex, as listed in the first 4 columns.
35 The total adult
population in these counties in 2002 was 3,909,921, as shown at the bottom.  The objective is to
construct weights for the sample that “replicate” the sample observation such that the weighted
sample reflects the distribution of the Danish population in column 4.  There were three sampling
stages.  The first was the choice of a random sample of people to contact, as described above.  This
sample of 664 is distributed by county, age group and sex as shown in the “Contacted” column. 
The second sampling stage was the recruitment stage, in which a subset of this 664 contacted us in
response to our letter of invitation and agreed to participate.  The sample of recruited subjects was
268, as shown in the “Recruited” column.  The third sampling stage was the actual attendance stage,
where a subset of the 268 that were recruited actually showed up for the experiment.  The final
sample of subjects was 253, as shown in the columns “Participated” and “Participated Share”.
The probability of inclusion in the final sample is then given by dividing, for each county,
age group and sex, the number of individuals that actually participated by the population.  This
probability, shown as column “Probability of Inclusion,” is just the sample that participated divided36  This approach is explained by Harrison and Lesley [1996].  The alternative is to estimate the
statistical model using information on the sample design, in order to generate estimates at that level reflecting
the population.  We plan to examine and compare both methods in subsequent work.
37 It is possible to undertake experiments over the web with a large sample of subjects drawn from
the population.  Kapteyn and Teppa [2003] illustrate how one can elicit hypothetical responses to elicit time
preferences using a panel of 2,000 Dutch households connected by home computer to surveys.  Although not
concerned with risk and time preferences directly, Hey [2002] illustrates how one can augment such electronic
panel surveys with real experiments. Donkers and van Soest [1999] elicit hypothetical risk and time
preferences from pre-existing panels of Dutch households being surveyed for other reasons.
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by the target population (i.e., column “Sample Participated” ÷ column “Population Size”).  The
sample weight, shown in column “Weight,” is the inverse of the probability of inclusion.  As a check
on this arithmetic, column “Check Frequency” shows the sample in each cell (row) multiplied by the
sample weight: the sum of this weighted frequency must, by construction, equal the target
population of Denmark. The sample weights in column “Weight”  will be used to weight the
responses in our statistical analysis, so as to generate unbiased estimates for the adult Danish
population.  Our approach is to estimate statistical models of observed behavior using un-weighted
responses, to use those models to estimate measures of risk aversion or individual discount rates for
individuals in the sample, and then to use the sample weights to calculate weighted averages for the
population.
36
B. Conduct of the Sessions
To minimize travel times for subjects, we reserved hotel meeting rooms in convenient
locations across Denmark in which to conduct sessions.
37 Because the sessions lasted for two hours,
light refreshments were provided. Participants met in groups of no more than 10. To conduct
computerized experiments in this field study, we found it was cost-effective to purchase laptop
computers and transport them to the meeting sites. It was not necessary to network the computers
for these experiments; the program ran independently on each computer and results for each subject
were downloaded onto the laptop that he or she used.  Each subject is identified by a unique ID
number. For the randomization procedures, two bingo cages were used in each session, one
containing 100 balls, and the other containing 3 to 11 balls, depending on the number of decision38 See the file “Screen Shots.pdf” at http:\\www.bus.ucf.edu\gharrison\data\ee\idr_and_risk\. 
These displays are an English translation of the original Danish.
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rows in the iMPL used in different treatments. We found two bingo cages to be the most
transparent and convenient way to generate random outcomes in the experiments. 
To begin the sessions, subjects were welcomed and reminded that they were to be paid 500
DKK for their participation to cover travel costs as long as they were able to stay for the full two
hours required for the experiment. Anyone who was not able to stay for the full two hours was paid
100 DKK and excused from the experiment. The experimenters then asked for a volunteer to
inspect and verify the bingo cages and number of bingo balls.
Instructions for the experiment were provided on the computer screens, and subjects read
through the instructions while the experimenter read them aloud. The experimenters followed the
same script for each session; this script is reproduced in the appendix.  A complete listing of the
screen displays and instructions seen by subjects is also available.
38
The experiment was conducted in four parts. Part I consisted of a questionnaire collecting
subjects’ socio-demographic characteristics. Part IV consisted of another questionnaire  which elicits
information on the subject’s financial market instruments, and probes the subject for information on
their expectations about their future economic conditions and their own future financial position.
The questionnaires are rather long, so we chose to divide them across Parts I and IV in order to
reduce subject fatigue and boredom. Both questionnaires are reproduced in an appendix. 
Part II consisted of the four risk aversion tasks, and Part III presented subjects with the six
discount rate tasks.  Before payments were determined for Part III, we asked subjects what they
planned to do with the payments they might receive for Part III. The computer screen shots
containing instructions and tasks are reproduced in appendix.
The four risk aversion tasks incorporate the incentive structure as described in Section 2A,
and assigned frames as described in Section 3A. After subjects completed the four tasks, several
random outcomes were generated in order to determine subject payments. For all subjects, one of-23-
the four tasks was chosen, then one of the decision rows in that task was chosen. For those subjects
whose decision at that row led to Level 2, another random draw was required to choose a decision
row in Level 2, and yet another random draw was required should that decision have led a subject to
Level 3 in the iMPL.  To maintain anonymity we performed the draws without announcing to which
subjects it would apply.  In the case where a subject indicated Indifference for the chosen decision
row, another random draw determined whether the subject received the results from Lottery A or
Lottery B. At this point all subjects knew whether they were playing Lottery A or Lottery B, and
another random draw determined whether subjects were to receive the high payment or the low
payment. Finally, a 10-sided die was rolled for each subject. Any subject who received a roll of “0”
received actual payment according to that final outcome. All payments were made at the end of the
experiment. 
A significant amount of time is spent training subjects on the iMPL and the randomization
procedures in Part II of the experiment . Subjects were given handouts containing examples of Level
1 and Level 2 of an iMPL that had been filled in. The training exercise explained the logic of the
iMPL and verified that subjects were able to correctly fill in an iMPL as shown in the handout. Next,
the experimenters illustrated the random procedures necessary to reach a final lottery outcome for
each possible choice in the chosen Level 1 decision row. Finally, a single trainer task was conducted
in which payments were in the form of candies. The ten-sided die was rolled for each subject, and
candies were given to each subject who received a roll of “0.”
Finally, the six discount rate tasks, covering the 6 time horizons as described in Section 2B,
were conducted. Because this task also used the iMPL format, with the same randomization
procedures as the risk aversion task, it was not necessary to repeat the training exercises.39 Several checks are undertaken for the specification.  First, collapsing the intervals down to their
mid-point allows a comparison of random-effects and fixed-effects specifications, and a Hausman test that
the random-effects specification is consistent.  There is no evidence that the random-effects specification is
inconsistent, using the 90% or so of responses that had an interval less than 7 percentage points.  Second, a
Breusch-Pagan test of the null hypothesis that there is no variance in the unobserved individual random
effects is convincingly rejected.  Third, since potentially fragile numerical quadrature methods are used to
estimate this specification, we checked for numerical stability as the number of quadrature points is varied,
and there was no evidence of instability in the log-likelihood or any of the individual coefficients. These
specification tests are performed for all of our panel models with very similar results.
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5.  Results
A.  Risk Aversion
Figure 3 shows the observed distribution of risk attitudes in our sample, using the raw mid-
point of the elicited interval in the final iteration stage of the iMPL.  This distribution reflects the
symmetric menu treatment, which is the appropriate baseline to evaluate the asymmetric menu
treatments.  For this specification of CRRA, a value of 0 denotes risk neutrality, negative values
indicate risk-loving, and positive values indicate risk aversion.  Thus we see evidence of slight risk
aversion.  The mean CRRA coefficient is 0.33 and the median is 0.28. This distribution is consistent
with comparable estimates obtained in the United States, using college students and an MPL design,
by Holt and Laury [2002] and Harrison, Johnson, McInnes and Rutström [2003a][2003b].
Relatively few subjects appear to exhibit any risk-preference. Friedman [1981] argues that
subjects should never exhibit risk-loving behavior in the laboratory even if they are risk lovers, since
they have cheaper ways to purchase uncertainty in the field (e.g., purchase of lottery tickets, or trips
to a casino).  Our findings are consistent with this “field censoring” hypothesis, although it could
just be that nobody in our sample was a risk lover. 
We run a number of regression models on our data and Table 5 lists the definitions of the
explanatory variables, and some summary statistics.  Table 6 displays a panel interval regression
model of the elicited CRRA values.  This model uses panel data since each subject provided four
responses, one for each stake condition.
39  Unobserved individual effects are modeled using a
random-effects specification in all of our panel models.  The variables skewLO and skewHI simply
control for the frame used, which will be discussed later.  We observe that there is an effect on the40 One can either allow for this effect with a CRRA characterization that conditions on it, as we do
here, or explore more flexible specifications than CRRA that might incorporate such variations within a single
functional form.
41 The term “final” refers to the iterations of the iMPL procedure.
42  This conclusion is confirmed by a likelihood ratio test with a significance level of 61%.
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CRRA coefficient from varying the lottery prizes across the 4 tasks. There is a significant difference
between Task 1 (the reference task for this statistical analysis) and the other three tasks. In particular,
Task 2 is associated with higher CRRA responses, with a significant coefficient value of 0.32. We
therefore confirm the findings reported in Holt and Laury [2002] and Harrison, Johnson, McInnes,
and Rutström [2003a] that the relative risk aversion coefficient is not constant in the stakes, although
here we varied the stakes in a non-monotonic manner.
40
B. Discount Rates
Figure 4 displays the elicited discount rates for our subjects, using the mid-point of the final
interval selected and pooling across all horizons. We observe variations of elicited IDR across
subjects, with a mean of 23.1%, a median of 22.4%, and a standard deviation of 14.0%. These 
values are somewhat lower than those found in laboratory elicitation exercises on American students
by CW, who report a mean of 33.4% and a median of 26.7% using a horizon of 60 days. They are
also lower than those found in the earlier field study by HLW on the Danish population, who report
a mean of 28.1% and a median of 27.8% for horizons of 6, 12, 24 and 36 months.
Figure 5 displays the discount rates by horizon.  The distribution of elicited rates for the 1
month and 4 month horizons have a model response around 30%.  The distributions for the other
horizons have less pronounced modal responses at lower rates.
Table 7 reports the results from a panel interval regression of the final
41 elicited discount
rates, controlling for horizon and individual demographics.  This model uses panel data since each
subject provided six interval responses, one for each horizon.  This regression shows that all
horizons have significantly lower discount rates than the reference horizon, which is 1 month. In
addition the discount rates do not vary across the other horizons.
4243 In the symmetric treatment the average interval was 0.34 and the median interval was 0.31. The
average interval was 0.42, and the median interval was 0.36, when all data is included.
44 Of course, the variation in the distribution in Figure 3 is “between subjects,” and the variation in
intervals suggested by Figure 4 is “within subjects,” but the two go together in a complete analysis to
determine overall uncertainty in the estimated CRRA for the sample.
45 Sixty-six percent of the sample has an interval below 0.1 in their final iMPL iteration. In the
symmetric treatment the average interval was 0.10 and the median was 0.04. The average interval was 0.14,
and the median was only 0.05, when all data is included.
46 Also known as the Wilcoxon rank-sum test or the Mann-Whitney two-sample test.
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C. Effects of Using the Iterative MPL Procedure
Figure 6 shows how allowing subjects to iterate over the MPL valuation has an effect on
CRRA interval sizes, and therefore on the precision with which we estimate the CRRA coefficients. 
In the first stage of the iMPL the subject faces the same, relatively coarse, grid of probabilities used
in previous MPL studies to elicit risk aversion.  Precision depends partly on how risk averse a
subject is, since even intervals in probabilities do not map into even intervals in CRRA coefficients.
In terms of the implied bounds between the upper and lower CRRA intervals, the top panel of
Figure 6 shows that the average subject had implied CRRA intervals around 0.3 and 0.4.
43 
Comparison with the range of elicited CRRA mid-points in Figure 3 provides some perspective on
the relative significance of this interval size.  The average interval width in the first stage of the iMPL
is about equal to the first-stage mean CRRA coefficient. Thus, there is a great deal of uncertainty
regarding an individual’s risk coefficient when based only on the decision in this first stage.
44 
Allowing iterations in the iMPL has to reduce the interval, since it cannot increase it by design, and
the bottom panel of Figure 6 shows that it did lead to a dramatic reduction in the width of the
elicited CRRA interval, and therefore in the uncertainty over the CRRA coefficients we elicit for our
subjects.  The vast majority of intervals for the final decision that subjects made were below 0.1 in
terms of the implied CRRA values.
45 These reductions in the size of the intervals due to the
iterations are highly significant, using either an unconditional rank-sum test
46 or a panel Tobit
regression controlling for possible confounds such as sample differences in demographics.  The
dependant variable (crraDIFF) is the difference between the upper and the lower bound of the
CRRA interval for the subject. These data are a panel since we have four elicited intervals from each-27-
subject, corresponding to Tasks 1, 2, 3 and 4 in the experiment.  Table 8 shows the estimated model;
the coefficient on the dummy variable Final captures the significant reduction in the interval size. 
We conclude that there is much to be gained from using the iMPL format in terms of the
increase in the precision of the elicited risk attitude. We can further test whether there appears to be
some behavioral effect from iterating that creates a bias in the observed final iteration as compared
to the initial response. Assuming we have a random sample, then if there is no behavioral bias we
would expect the responses in the final iteration to be the same as the responses in the initial
iteration on average. We test for the presence of response bias using a panel interval regression, in
which the dependant variable is the elicited CRRA interval for the subject, including both the initial
and the final iteration stage. The results are shown in Table 9, and the coefficient on Final shows
that there is no bias in this data. It is slightly positive, but not statistically significant.
For the IDR data we similarly find that we get increased precision from using the iMPL
response format. The top panel of Figure 7 shows that the average subject had intervals that were 5
to 6 percentage points in terms of the implied AER when pooling over all horizons. The bottom
panel of Figure 7 shows that the iMPL iterations did lead to a dramatic reduction in the width of the
elicited IDR interval, and therefore in the uncertainty over the discount rates we elicit for our
subjects.  The vast majority of intervals for the final decision that subjects made were below 1.0
percentage point: the average was 1.5 percentage points, with a median of only 0.31 of a percentage
point. The reductions in the size of the intervals due to the iterations are highly significant, again
using either an unconditional rank-sum test or a panel Tobit regression controlling for
demographics. The dependant variable (idrDIFF) is the difference between the upper and the lower
bound of the IDR interval for the subject. Table 10 shows the results of estimating this model, and
the coefficient on the dummy variable Final again captures the significant reduction in the interval
size. We can also test if allowing iterations creates a response bias when comparing final to initial
responses. Table 11 regresses the elicited IDR on the dummy variable Final and a range of
demographics, as well as dummies capturing the horizons. For this model we include both the initial47 Obviously one could undertake such tests as well for the discount rate elicitation task.
48 Some of the detail shown in Figure 3, such as the spike close to r = 0.8, does not appear in Figure 5
due to the wider histogram intervals.
49 The row number corresponds to the “number of safe choices” in the statistical analysis of HL
[2002].  We generally prefer to evaluate the effects of treatments on implied risk aversion measures, since the
two are not always the same, but in this case it is informative to do both.
-28-
and the final responses. The coefficient on Final is small and positive, but statistically insignificant,
again implying no obvious response bias. These discount rate regressions confirm the conclusion
from the risk preference regressions that there is a value in allowing interactions, since precision is
improved and there is no evidence of a response bias.
D. Framing Effects
Figure 8 examines one of the design issues that concerned us: whether the symmetry of the
menu options in the iMPL design effects behavior.  We only test this issue for the risk preference
elicitation task.
47 The top and bottom panels show the predicted CRRA for the asymmetric menu
treatments.  In one case the menu was skewed towards eliciting a lower risk aversion estimate if
subjects anchored on the frame, and in the other case it was skewed towards eliciting a higher risk aversion
estimate if the subjects anchored.  The middle panel displays the same information from the symmetric
menu treatment shown in Figure 3.
48  Inspection of these three panels suggests that there is a slight
effect from the asymmetric menu designed to lower elicited risk aversion, but a more significant
effect from the asymmetric menu designed to increase elicited risk aversion. The average CRRA
coefficient is 0.33 in the symmetric treatment, and 0.15 and 0.51 in the skewLO and skewHI
treatments, respectively. 
In order to verify that these treatment differences in initial responses are not simply an
artifact of the interval regression model being estimated on CRRA intervals of different size across
the treatments, we compare responses based on the row number at which subjects switched to the
riskier lottery in the initial iteration.
49  Figure 9 displays the responses in the initial iteration of the
iMPL in a way that allows a comparison of the symmetric and asymmetric treatments.  Consider the50 Both the skewLO and the skewHI distributions are significantly different from the appropriately
aggregated symmetric responses using a chi-square test. Both significance levels are less than 1%.
51  The unconditional results are virtually identical.
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left panels first, which compare the skewLO and symmetric responses.  The top left panel simply
shows the distribution of choices of each row in the skewLO experiments.  The bottom left panel
reports the distribution of responses in the symmetric design, but with the responses “aggregated”
to match the skewLO design.  That is, the first three rows of the skewLO and symmetric design
represent the same probabilities; the fourth row of the skewLO design matches to rows 4 and 5 of
the symmetric design; the fifth row of the skewLO design matches to rows 6 and 7 of the symmetric
design; and the sixth row of the skewLO design matches to rows 8, 9 and 10 of the symmetric design. 
Thus we can directly compare the distributions on the left-hand side. The panels on the right-hand
side do the comparable aggregation for the skewHI and symmetric responses.
The results suggest that there was some initial framing of responses, in the first iteration of
the iMPL.  If there had been no framing, then the distributions on the left would look similar, as
would the distributions on the right (and indeed they would all look alike).  We observe that the
skewLO treatment did generate responses that imply lower CRRA values, since the distribution in the
top left is skewed to the left compared to the one below it.  Similarly, the skewHI treatment shows a
difference, with the distribution on the top skewed to the right compared to the one below it.
50 
These differences translate into statistically significant differences in average CRRA in the panel
interval regression model shown in Table 12, after controlling for individual and session
characteristics.
51  For the skewLO treatment, this effect is -0.19 on the average CRRA, and is
statistically significant at the 3% level.  For the skewHI treatment, the effect is +0.33 on the average
CRRA, and is statistically significant at less than the 0.1% level.
It is not possible to undertake a comparison of the rows selected after the iMPL iterations are
complete, since the row numbers are path dependant and could correspond to very different
probabilities.  But it is possible to compare the treatments in terms of the final implied CRRA
intervals, using the statistical model introduced above to examine initial responses. This is shown in52 The experimenters were Lau and Steffen Anderson.  Both had experience in the conduct of these
laboratory experiments, in a number of trainers conducted and supervised in Copenhagen by Rutström.
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Table 6. We find that the effect on CRRA of the skewLO treatment disappears: it is estimated to be
only -0.017, and is statistically significant only at the 87% level.  On the other hand, the effect on
CRRA of the skewHI treatment persists: it is +0.35 and statistically significant at the 0.1% level.
E. Demographics
Since there are variations in responses across subjects it is of interest to test if these response
variations are captured by observable characteristics such as demographics. We collected a wide
number of observable characteristics in the questionnaires given to subjects, and some of them are
included in the regressions.
Table 6 reports the main results with respect to demographic effects on risk attitudes. We do
not find that the elicited risk attitudes are correlated with the sex of the subject. There is, however,
an age effect, as shown by the middle age variable and the fact that all three age variables are jointly
significant at the 2.5% significance level. We also find that students are much more risk averse,
displaying a CRRA that is 0.33 higher than non-students. Skilled subjects are also much more risk
averse, with a CRRA that is 0.44 higher. We find a significantly lower CRRA for those subjects who
declared themselves as light smokers, compared to those that do not smoke or smoke intensively.
Finally, since there are reasons to suspect that risk attitudes may be a function of a person’s income
level, we also include an income variable in the regressions. Nevertheless, there are no income
effects, although this is arguably already captured by other included variables (e.g., education).
Table 7 reports the main results with respect to demographic effects on discount rates. 
None of the included variables are strongly significant. Only age, as captured by the old age variable,
and being located in Copenhagen are significant at the 10% level.
We are delighted to report no apparent effects in either elicitation task from the
experimenter that actually conducted the sessions.
52-31-
6.  Conclusions
It is feasible to collect nationally representative estimates of risk and time preferences using
controlled experiments.  The sampling, recruiting, and experimental procedures we employed in
Denmark could be adapted to other countries.  The experimental procedures used can also be
applied in more traditional laboratory settings with standard, college-recruited subject pools.
We conclude that our recruitment method worked extremely well for this population.  We
mailed out 664 invitations, generating 271 affirmative responses. This is a response rate of 41%,
which can be considered high given that respondents would have to travel to participate in the study.
Further, out of these 271 responses, only 18 (less than 7%) did not turn up to the session.
Our basic methodology is adopted from earlier studies. The MPL that we use in both the
CRRA and the IDR elicitations has been employed previously in several studies.  We implemented a
variation of this instrument, the iMPL, in order to generate more precise responses. Our findings
confirm that there is a strong improvement in precision, with no apparent behavioral effect, from
implementing this method. Further, we were concerned about the possibility of framing effects in
the MPL. We do find such effects, with the initial responses in our two asymmetric treatments
significantly different from the standard, symmetric one. Nevertheless, after iteration using the iMPL
instrument, at least one such difference disappears. Our conclusion is that, with iteration, there is
consistency between the responses in the symmetric and one of the asymmetric frames, providing
some evidentiary basis for adopting a symmetric frame.-32-
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1 3,000 DKK 3,038 DKK 2.5 2.52   A B
2 3,000 DKK 3,075 DKK 5 5.09   A B
3 3,000 DKK 3,114 DKK 7.5 7.71   A B
4 3,000 DKK 3,152 DKK 10 10.38   A B
5 3,000 DKK 3,190 DKK 12.5 13.1   A B
6 3,000 DKK 3,229 DKK 15 15.87   A B
7 3,000 DKK 3,268 DKK 17.5 18.68   A B
8 3,000 DKK 3,308 DKK 20 21.55   A B
9 3,000 DKK 3,347 DKK 22.5 24.47   A B
10 3,000 DKK 3,387 DKK 25 27.44   A B
11 3,000 DKK 3,427 DKK 27.5 30.47   A B
12 3,000 DKK 3,467 DKK 30 33.55   A B
13 3,000 DKK 3,507 DKK 32.5 36.68   A B
14 3,000 DKK 3,548 DKK 35 39.87   A B
15 3,000 DKK 3,589 DKK 37.5 43.11   A B
16 3,000 DKK 3,630 DKK 40 46.41   A B
17 3,000 DKK 3,671 DKK 42.5 49.77   A B
18 3,000 DKK 3,713 DKK 45 53.18   A B
19 3,000 DKK 3,755 DKK 47.5 56.65   A B
20 3,000 DKK 3,797 DKK 50 60.18   A B-37-













Greater Copenhagen area: 1,199,470 22.50 4  56 22.14
København/Frederiksberg 1 586,026 10.99 2 30 11.86
Københavns amt 15 613,444 11.51 2 26 10.28
Rest of Zeeland and Bornholm: 1,195,394 22.43 5 59 23.32
Frederiksborg amt 20 365,306 6.85 2 24 9.49
Roskilde amt 25 231,559 4.34 1 12 4.74
Vestsjællands amt 30 295,086 5.54 1 10 3.95
Storstrøms amt 35 259,106 4.86 1 13 5.14
Bornholms amt 40 44,337 0.83 0 0 0
Funen: 471,974 8.86 2 23 9.09
Fyns amt 42 471,974 8.86 2 23 9.09
Jutland: 2,463,182 46.21 9  115 45.45
Sønderjyllands amt 50 253,482 4.76 1 12 4.74
Ribe amt 55 224,345 4.21 1 14 5.53
Vejle amt 60 347,542 6.52 1 15 5.93
Ringkøbing amt 65 272,857 5.12 1 12 4.74
Århus amt 70 637,122 11.95 2 22 8.70
Viborg amt 76 233,681 4.38 1 15 5.93
Nordjyllands amt 80 494,153 9.27 2 25 9.88
Total Danish Population in 2002 5,330,020 100%
Total # sessions 20
Total sample size 253 100%-38-
Table 4: Construction of Sample Weights
Population Sample







1 Under 45 Male 153,811 0.0393 14 7 7 0.0277 0.00004551 21973 153811
1 Under 45 Female 150,340 0.0385 25 12 12 0.0474 0.00007982 12528.3 150340
1 45 and Over Male 76,208 0.0195 6 5 5 0.0198 0.00006561 15241.6 76208
1 45 and Over Female 81,227 0.0208 15 7 6 0.0237 0.00007387 13537.8 81227
15 Under 45 Male 110,556 0.0283 12 6 5 0.0198 0.00004523 22111.2 110556
15 Under 45 Female 110,621 0.0283 15 9 8 0.0316 0.00007232 13827.6 110621
15 45 and Over Male 107,890 0.0276 15 6 6 0.0237 0.00005561 17981.7 107890
15 45 and Over Female 118,568 0.0303 18 7 7 0.0277 0.00005904 16938.3 118568
20 Under 45 Male 63,164 0.0162 11 6 5 0.0198 0.00007916 12632.8 63164
20 Under 45 Female 63,848 0.0163 15 7 7 0.0277 0.00010964 9121.1 63848
20 45 and Over Male 69,795 0.0179 24 7 7 0.0277 0.00010029 9970.7 69795
20 45 and Over Female 72,972 0.0187 22 6 5 0.0198 0.00006852 14594.4 72972
25 Under 45 Male 42,722 0.0109 8 2 2 0.0079 0.00004681 21361 42722
25 Under 45 Female 42,691 0.0109 9 3 3 0.0119 0.00007027 14230.3 42691
25 45 and Over Male 43,438 0.0111 8 4 4 0.0158 0.00009209 10859.5 43438
25 45 and Over Female 44,772 0.0115 11 3 3 0.0119 0.00006701 14924 44772
30 and 35 Under 45 Male 97,408 0.0249 25 10 7 0.0277 0.00007186 13915.4 97408
30 and 35 Under 45 Female 94,362 0.0241 19 3 3 0.0119 0.00003179 31454 94362
30 and 35 45 and Over Male 108,816 0.0278 20 8 8 0.0316 0.00007352 13602 108816
30 and 35 45 and Over Female 109,722 0.0281 24 5 5 0.0198 0.00004557 21944.4 109722
42 Under 45 Male 87,916 0.0225 13 5 5 0.0198 0.00005687 17583.2 87916
42 Under 45 Female 85,043 0.0218 13 4 4 0.0158 0.00004704 21260.8 85043
42 45 and Over Male 85,006 0.0217 19 9 8 0.0316 0.00009411 10625.8 85006
42 45 and Over Female 87,404 0.0224 15 7 6 0.0237 0.00006865 14567.3 87404
50 Under 45 Male 44,765 0.0114 5 2 2 0.0079 0.00004468 22382.5 44765
50 Under 45 Female 42,673 0.0109 8 3 3 0.0119 0.00007030 14224.3 42673
50 45 and Over Male 47,136 0.0121 9 4 4 0.0158 0.00008486 11784 47136
50 45 and Over Female 47,614 0.0122 16 4 3 0.0119 0.00006301 15871.3 47614
55 Under 45 Male 41,846 0.0107 7 1 1 0.004 0.00002390 41846 41846
55 Under 45 Female 39,429 0.0101 9 2 2 0.0079 0.00005072 19714.5 39429
55 45 and Over Male 39,910 0.0102 16 7 7 0.0277 0.00017539 5701.4 39910
55 45 and Over Female 39,766 0.0102 8 4 4 0.0158 0.00010059 9941.5 39766
60 Under 45 Male 67,685 0.0173 8 5 5 0.0198 0.00007387 13537 67685
60 Under 45 Female 64,537 0.0165 7 4 4 0.0158 0.00006198 16134.3 64537
60 45 and Over Male 61,320 0.0157 7 3 3 0.0119 0.00004892 20440 61320
60 45 and Over Female 62,359 0.0159 8 3 3 0.0119 0.00004811 20786.3 62359
65 and 76 Under 45 Male 94,070 0.0241 12 3 2 0.0079 0.00002126 47035 94070-39-
65 and 76 Under 45 Female 88,441 0.0226 11 6 6 0.0237 0.00006784 14740.2 88441
65 and 76 45 and Over Male 91,176 0.0233 17 9 9 0.0356 0.00009871 10130.7 91176
65 and 76 45 and Over Female 90,721 0.0232 20 11 10 0.0395 0.00011023 9072.1 90721
70 Under 45 Male 130,194 0.0333 12 6 5 0.0198 0.00003840 26038.8 130194
70 Under 45 Female 128,962 0.033 17 8 6 0.0237 0.00004653 21493.7 128962
70 45 and Over Male 107,775 0.0276 12 4 3 0.0119 0.00002784 35925 107775
70 45 and Over Female 110,524 0.0283 19 8 8 0.0316 0.00007238 13815.5 110524
80 Under 45 Male 94,315 0.0241 17 9 8 0.0316 0.00008482 11789.4 94315
80 Under 45 Female 88,504 0.0226 15 6 6 0.0237 0.00006779 14750.7 88504
80 45 and Over Male 88,195 0.0226 12 4 4 0.0158 0.00004535 22048.8 88195
80 45 and Over Female 89,704 0.0229 16 7 7 0.0277 0.00007803 12814.9 89704
All 3,909,921 1.000 664 271 253 1.000  838804.1 3,909,921-40-




young Aged less than 30
middle Aged between 40 and 50
old Aged over 50
single Lives alone
kids Has children
nhhd Number of people in the household
owner Owns own home or apartment
retired Retired
student Student
skilled Some post-secondary education
longedu Substantial higher education
IncLow Lower level income
IncHigh Higher level income
copen Lives in greater Copenhagen area
city Lives in larger city of 20,000 or more
smoker Current smoker
Hsmoker Heavy smoker (15 cigarettes or more per day)
experimenter Experimenter Steffen Anderson
Variable N Mean Std.  Dev. Minimum Maximum
_________________________________________________________________________
female 251 .5179283 .5006768 0 1
young 251 .1713147 .3775366          0           1
middle 251 .2788845 .4493466 0 1
old 251 .3705179 .4839084 0 1
single 251 .2031873 .4031747 0 1
kids 251 .2868526 .4531958 0 1
nhhd 250 2.5  1.1625 1 5
owner 251 .689243 .4637282 0 1
retired 251 .1553785 .3629889 0 1
student 251 .0916335 .2890843 0 1
skilled 251 .5099602 .5008996 0 1
longedu 251 .3665339 .4828204 0 1
IncLow 251 .3426295 .475537 0 1
IncHigh 251 .3386454 .4741946 0 1
copen 251 .2709163 .445321 0 1
city 251 .3904382 .4888233 0 1
smoker 251 .2788845 .4493466 0 1
Hsmoker 251 .1593625 .3667451 0 1-41-
Table 6: Statistical Model of Risk Aversion Responses
Final Responses
Random-effects interval regression              Number of obs      =       934
Group variable (i) : id                         Number of groups   =       245
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Obs per group: min =         1
                                                               avg =       3.8
                                                               max =         4
                                                Wald chi2(24)      =     89.29
Log likelihood  =  -3295.927                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
      skewLO |  -.0167883    .106222    -0.16   0.874    -.2249796     .191403
      skewHI |    .349161   .1090158     3.20   0.001      .135494    .5628281
       Task2 |   .3208486   .0585126     5.48   0.000      .206166    .4355313
       Task3 |   .1719514   .0592059     2.90   0.004       .05591    .2879927
       Task4 |   .1319254   .0591038     2.23   0.026     .0160841    .2477668
experimenter |  -.0647686   .0898346    -0.72   0.471    -.2408412    .1113041
      female |   -.046791   .0902622    -0.52   0.604    -.2237017    .1301197
       young |   .2371668   .1766755     1.34   0.179    -.1091108    .5834444
      middle |  -.2555581   .1377409    -1.86   0.064    -.5255252     .014409
         old |  -.0856448   .1588999    -0.54   0.590    -.3970829    .2257934
      single |   .1210025   .1466161     0.83   0.409    -.1663598    .4083649
        kids |   .0608446   .1410428     0.43   0.666    -.2155943    .3372835
        nhhd |   .0292497   .0617489     0.47   0.636    -.0917758    .1502753
       owner |   .0282877   .1234315     0.23   0.819    -.2136335    .2702089
     retired |   .0676035   .1483601     0.46   0.649    -.2231769    .3583839
     student |   .3294951   .1751346     1.88   0.060    -.0137625    .6727526
     skilled |   .4392735   .1371773     3.20   0.001      .170411    .7081361
     longedu |  -.2271383   .1419633    -1.60   0.110    -.5053811    .0511046
      IncLow |  -.0819322   .1236864    -0.66   0.508    -.3243531    .1604888
     IncHigh |   .0350592   .1168421     0.30   0.764    -.1939471    .2640655
       copen |   .1542444   .1204794     1.28   0.200    -.0818908    .3903796
        city |   .0885159   .1105303     0.80   0.423    -.1281196    .3051513
      smoker |  -.3557223    .142123    -2.50   0.012    -.6342782   -.0771665
     Hsmoker |   .1982445   .1764735     1.12   0.261    -.1476371    .5441262
       _cons |   .3244394   .2777311     1.17   0.243    -.2199035    .8687823
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
    /sigma_u |   .5750569   .0349078    16.47   0.000     .5066388     .643475
    /sigma_e |   .6217417   .0177425    35.04   0.000     .5869671    .6565163
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
         rho |   .4610512   .0345438                      .3942306    .5289926
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------42-
      Table 7: Statistical Model of Individual Discount Rates Responses
Final Responses
Random-effects interval regression              Number of obs      =      1512
Group variable (i): id                          Number of groups   =       252
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Obs per group: min =         6
                                                               avg =       6.0
                                                               max =         6
                                                Wald chi2(24)      =     40.03
Log likelihood  = -7217.3187                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0212
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
      IDR    |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
    horizon4 |  -2.951431   1.140498    -2.59   0.010    -5.186767   -.7160955
    horizon6 |  -3.402696   1.140059    -2.98   0.003     -5.63717   -1.168222
   horizon12 |  -4.453997   1.138327    -3.91   0.000    -6.685076   -2.222918
   horizon18 |   -3.63278    1.13982    -3.19   0.001    -5.866787   -1.398773
   horizon24 |  -2.784719   1.140615    -2.44   0.015    -5.020283   -.5491551
experimenter |  -2.015878   2.075104    -0.97   0.331    -6.083008    2.051252
      female |   .5124748   2.081916     0.25   0.806    -3.568005    4.592955
       young |  -2.413334   4.032679    -0.60   0.550    -10.31724    5.490571
      middle |   1.526676   3.226868     0.47   0.636    -4.797869     7.85122
         old |   6.657465   3.682905     1.81   0.071    -.5608969    13.87583
      single |   1.578346   3.359613     0.47   0.638    -5.006374    8.163066
        kids |   3.434926   3.322419     1.03   0.301    -3.076896    9.946748
        nhhd |   .0752292   1.412897     0.05   0.958    -2.693998    2.844457
       owner |    .310557   2.820853     0.11   0.912    -5.218213    5.839327
     retired |  -5.190188   3.280882    -1.58   0.114     -11.6206    1.240222
     student |  -.4317768   3.933313    -0.11   0.913    -8.140928    7.277375
     skilled |   1.430957   3.100312     0.46   0.644    -4.645544    7.507457
     longedu |  -3.595279   3.247915    -1.11   0.268    -9.961075    2.770517
      IncLow |   2.532038    2.83444     0.89   0.372    -3.023363    8.087439
     IncHigh |  -3.040593    2.68345    -1.13   0.257    -8.300058    2.218872
       copen |   4.761834   2.821852     1.69   0.092    -.7688955    10.29256
        city |   3.566916   2.499403     1.43   0.154    -1.331824    8.465657
      smoker |   4.306187   3.358237     1.28   0.200    -2.275837    10.88821
     Hsmoker |   1.282751   4.146975     0.31   0.757    -6.845171    9.410674
       _cons |   23.94169   6.259744     3.82   0.000     11.67282    36.21056
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
    /sigma_u |   14.61783   .7645028    19.12   0.000     13.11943    16.11622
    /sigma_e |   12.58199   .2667832    47.16   0.000      12.0591    13.10487
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
         rho |   .5744306   .0276952                       .519614    .6278432
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------43-
Table 8: Effect of Iterations on Risk Aversion Responses
Panel Tobit Model of Difference in Elicited CRRA Estimates. 
Initial and Final Responses Pooled
Random-effects tobit regression                 Number of obs      =       730
Group variable (i) : id                         Number of groups   =       113
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Obs per group: min =         1
                                                               avg =       6.5
                                                               max =         8
                                                Wald chi2(23)      =    929.24
Log likelihood  =  498.79559                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    crraDIFF |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
       Final |   -.247383   .0087356   -28.32   0.000    -.2645045   -.2302614
       Task2 |   .0603288   .0118897     5.07   0.000     .0370255    .0836321
       Task3 |   .0082081   .0122037     0.67   0.501    -.0157107    .0321269
       Task4 |  -.0591118    .012554    -4.71   0.000    -.0837171   -.0345064
experimenter |   -.007877   .0122702    -0.64   0.521    -.0319261    .0161721
      female |   .0128527   .0126012     1.02   0.308    -.0118452    .0375505
       young |  -.0349022   .0245179    -1.42   0.155    -.0829564    .0131519
      middle |   .0199858   .0194358     1.03   0.304    -.0181077    .0580792
         old |   .0023571   .0219886     0.11   0.915    -.0407397    .0454539
      single |     .00333   .0185302     0.18   0.857    -.0329885    .0396484
        kids |  -.0349732   .0194554    -1.80   0.072     -.073105    .0031587
        nhhd |   .0003645   .0078549     0.05   0.963    -.0150309    .0157599
       owner |   .0211125   .0151367     1.39   0.163     -.008555    .0507799
     retired |  -.0075702   .0185515    -0.41   0.683    -.0439304    .0287901
     student |   .0240848   .0255366     0.94   0.346     -.025966    .0741356
     skilled |  -.0094639   .0179591    -0.53   0.598    -.0446631    .0257353
     longedu |   -.006914   .0194073    -0.36   0.722    -.0449517    .0311236
      IncLow |   .0338228   .0158129     2.14   0.032     .0028301    .0648156
     IncHigh |   .0123896   .0158968     0.78   0.436    -.0187676    .0435469
       copen |  -.0082217   .0164097    -0.50   0.616    -.0403842    .0239407
        city |   .0163703   .0135521     1.21   0.227    -.0101912    .0429318
      smoker |   .0229837   .0193794     1.19   0.236    -.0149992    .0609667
     Hsmoker |  -.0513774   .0223863    -2.30   0.022    -.0952537    -.007501
       _cons |      .3233   .0389821     8.29   0.000     .2468965    .3997035
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
    /sigma_u |   .0331676   .0072419     4.58   0.000     .0189738    .0473615
    /sigma_e |   .1160568   .0033892    34.24   0.000      .109414    .1226996
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
         rho |   .0755076   .0320131                      .0302637    .1598736
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------44-
Table 9: Additional Analysis of the Effect of Iterations on Risk Aversion Responses
Panel Interval Regression Model of Elicited CRRA Estimates. 
Initial and Final Responses Pooled
Random-effects interval regression              Number of obs      =      1741
Group variable (i) : id                         Number of groups   =       245
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Obs per group: min =         1
                                                               avg =       7.1
                                                               max =         8
                                                Wald chi2(23)      =    290.81
Log likelihood  = -4496.0868                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
       Crra  |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
       Final |   .0306908   .0271022     1.13   0.257    -.0224286    .0838102
       Task2 |   .3030556   .0375698     8.07   0.000     .2294202     .376691
       Task3 |   .1781446   .0378936     4.70   0.000     .1038745    .2524147
       Task4 |   .1739772   .0379571     4.58   0.000     .0995825    .2483718
experimenter |  -.1326938   .0504983    -2.63   0.009    -.2316686   -.0337191
      female |   .0128177   .0645301     0.20   0.843     -.113659    .1392943
       young |   .3973882   .1011376     3.93   0.000     .1991621    .5956143
      middle |  -.0776657   .1093616    -0.71   0.478    -.2920105    .1366792
         old |   .1339898   .0889848     1.51   0.132    -.0404173    .3083969
      single |    .108051   .0792937     1.36   0.173    -.0473619    .2634638
        kids |   .0584345   .0810842     0.72   0.471    -.1004875    .2173566
        nhhd |   .0534767   .0322025     1.66   0.097     -.009639    .1165923
       owner |   .0315737   .0650945     0.49   0.628    -.0960092    .1591566
     retired |   .0399379   .0801643     0.50   0.618    -.1171813    .1970571
     student |   .2678469   .0865312     3.10   0.002     .0982488     .437445
     skilled |   .4462482   .0706358     6.32   0.000     .3078046    .5846917
     longedu |  -.2862586   .0724578    -3.95   0.000    -.4282734   -.1442439
      IncLow |  -.1255784   .0735824    -1.71   0.088    -.2697972    .0186403
     IncHigh |   -.031704    .064428    -0.49   0.623    -.1579805    .0945725
       copen |   .2937483   .0711131     4.13   0.000     .1543691    .4331275
        city |   .0635789   .0674473     0.94   0.346    -.0686153    .1957732
      smoker |  -.6739033   .0801156    -8.41   0.000     -.830927   -.5168795
     Hsmoker |   .4874867   .1024848     4.76   0.000     .2866202    .6883532
       _cons |   .2639952   .1352492     1.95   0.051    -.0010884    .5290788
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
    /sigma_u |   .6443877   .0252071    25.56   0.000     .5949827    .6937927
    /sigma_e |   .5255983   .0106143    49.52   0.000     .5047948    .5464019
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
         rho |   .6004947    .021307                      .5582365    .6416063
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------45-
Table 10: Effect of Iterations on Discount Rate Responses
Panel Tobit Model of Difference in Elicited AER Estimates. 
Initial and Final Responses Pooled
Random-effects tobit regression                 Number of obs      =      2542
Group variable (i) : id                         Number of groups   =       247
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Obs per group: min =         2
                                                               avg =      10.3
                                                               max =        12
                                                Wald chi2(25)      =   7386.24
Log likelihood  = -4605.0752                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
     idrDIFF |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
       Final |  -4.822783   .0563467   -85.59   0.000    -4.933221   -4.712346
    horizon4 |  -.0680212   .0957468    -0.71   0.477    -.2556815    .1196391
    horizon6 |  -.2398107   .0958944    -2.50   0.012    -.4277604   -.0518611
   horizon12 |  -.2694823   .0953551    -2.83   0.005    -.4563748   -.0825898
   horizon18 |  -.1694557   .0960138    -1.76   0.078    -.3576392    .0187278
   horizon24 |  -.1559413    .096547    -1.62   0.106      -.34517    .0332874
experimenter |  -.0638593   .1275424    -0.50   0.617    -.3138378    .1861193
      female |  -.0651931   .1319159    -0.49   0.621    -.3237434    .1933573
       young |   -.111052   .2825972    -0.39   0.694    -.6649324    .4428284
      middle |   -.000592   .2145065    -0.00   0.998    -.4210169    .4198329
         old |  -.0290953   .2453384    -0.12   0.906    -.5099499    .4517592
      single |  -.0509168   .2290862    -0.22   0.824    -.4999175    .3980838
        kids |   .1469392   .2044257     0.72   0.472    -.2537278    .5476063
        nhhd |  -.0627641   .0849486    -0.74   0.460    -.2292602    .1037321
       owner |   .1229969   .1723184     0.71   0.475    -.2147409    .4607347
     retired |   .0597473    .187412     0.32   0.750    -.3075735    .4270681
     student |   .1304481   .2141394     0.61   0.542    -.2892573    .5501536
     skilled |  -.0551502   .1885786    -0.29   0.770    -.4247575    .3144571
     longedu |  -.1591903   .2284441    -0.70   0.486    -.6069325    .2885518
      IncLow |   .0436536   .1836707     0.24   0.812    -.3163344    .4036416
     IncHigh |  -.0481221   .1846529    -0.26   0.794    -.4100351    .3137909
       copen |  -.0046564   .1733778    -0.03   0.979    -.3444706    .3351577
        city |    .133596   .1765031     0.76   0.449    -.2123437    .4795356
      smoker |   1.015238   .2630751     3.86   0.000     .4996206    1.530856
     Hsmoker |  -.9144368   .2781515    -3.29   0.001    -1.459604   -.3692699
       _cons |   6.312955   .4330113    14.58   0.000     5.464269    7.161642
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
    /sigma_u |    1.12183   .0802256    13.98   0.000      .964591     1.27907
    /sigma_e |     1.3699   .0212255    64.54   0.000     1.328298    1.411501
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
         rho |     .40142   .0366976                      .3315371     .474615
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------46-
Table 11: Additional Analysis of the Effect of Iterations on Discount Rate Responses
Panel Interval Regression Model of Elicited AER Estimates. 
Initial and Final Responses Pooled
Random-effects interval regression              Number of obs      =      2724
Group variable (i) : id                         Number of groups   =       252
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Obs per group: min =         6
                                                               avg =      10.8
                                                               max =        12
                                                Wald chi2(24)      =      6.84
Log likelihood  = -12370.706                    Prob > chi2        =    0.9998
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
       Final |   1.205353   2.314448     0.52   0.603    -3.330882    5.741589
    horizon6 |  -1.948988   3.410399    -0.57   0.568    -8.633246    4.735271
   horizon12 |  -3.050504    3.38829    -0.90   0.368     -9.69143    3.590423
   horizon18 |  -1.824354   3.409488    -0.54   0.593    -8.506826    4.858119
   horizon24 |  -1.618764   3.430802    -0.47   0.637    -8.343012    5.105483
experimenter |  -2.876489   4.921217    -0.58   0.559     -12.5219    6.768919
      female |  -1.063944    4.96756    -0.21   0.830    -10.80018    8.672294
       young |  -3.987076   9.902097    -0.40   0.687    -23.39483    15.42068
      middle |   .5799799   7.699958     0.08   0.940    -14.51166    15.67162
         old |   5.200659   8.980249     0.58   0.563    -12.40031    22.80162
      single |   .5972698   8.005961     0.07   0.941    -15.09413    16.28867
        kids |   3.903694   7.731308     0.50   0.614    -11.24939    19.05678
        nhhd |  -.4766774   3.434756    -0.14   0.890    -7.208676    6.255321
       owner |    1.69317   6.801766     0.25   0.803    -11.63805    15.02439
     retired |  -5.745077   7.977922    -0.72   0.471    -21.38152    9.891362
     student |   .1799446    9.68561     0.02   0.985     -18.8035    19.16339
     skilled |   2.567078    7.41246     0.35   0.729    -11.96108    17.09523
     longedu |  -5.198941   7.794402    -0.67   0.505    -20.47569    10.07781
      IncLow |   1.988397   6.820654     0.29   0.771    -11.37984    15.35663
     IncHigh |   -4.01107   6.402067    -0.63   0.531    -16.55889    8.536751
       copen |    6.20363   6.740368     0.92   0.357    -7.007248    19.41451
        city |   5.544869   6.037677     0.92   0.358    -6.288762     17.3785
      smoker |   6.539486    7.92505     0.83   0.409    -8.993326     22.0723
     Hsmoker |   .9145829   9.717043     0.09   0.925    -18.13047    19.95964
       _cons |   26.36844   15.38108     1.71   0.086    -3.777924    56.51481
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
    /sigma_u |   32.69195          .        .       .            .           .
    /sigma_e |   58.38054          .        .       .            .           .
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
         rho |   .2387204          .                             .           .
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------47-
Table 12: Effect of Framing on Risk Aversion Responses
Panel Interval Regression Model of Elicited CRRA Estimates. 
Initial Responses
Random-effects interval regression              Number of obs      =       934
Group variable (i) : id                         Number of groups   =       245
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Obs per group: min =         1
                                                               avg =       3.8
                                                               max =         4
                                                Wald chi2(24)      =    117.20
Log likelihood  = -1574.3064                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
      skewLO |  -.1851846   .0852446    -2.17   0.030    -.3522609   -.0181082
      skewHI |   .3309519   .0857476     3.86   0.000     .1628897    .4990141
       Task2 |   .3034459   .0489464     6.20   0.000     .2075127     .399379
       Task3 |   .1493759   .0498432     3.00   0.003     .0516849    .2470668
       Task4 |   .1784382   .0494732     3.61   0.000     .0814725    .2754039
experimenter |  -.0661527   .0706578    -0.94   0.349    -.2046395    .0723341
      female |  -.0044123   .0716774    -0.06   0.951    -.1448974    .1360727
       young |   .2230871   .1401312     1.59   0.111     -.051565    .4977391
      middle |  -.1993846   .1102969    -1.81   0.071    -.4155626    .0167933
         old |  -.0818531   .1274835    -0.64   0.521    -.3317162      .16801
      single |   .1331792   .1156053     1.15   0.249    -.0934029    .3597614
        kids |   .0503195   .1115416     0.45   0.652    -.1682979     .268937
        nhhd |   .0095288   .0496428     0.19   0.848    -.0877693    .1068269
       owner |   .0775424   .0977384     0.79   0.428    -.1140213    .2691061
     retired |   .1172141   .1146344     1.02   0.307    -.1074652    .3418933
     student |   .2445757   .1377088     1.78   0.076    -.0253285    .5144799
     skilled |   .3826268     .10909     3.51   0.000     .1688143    .5964393
     longedu |  -.2228879   .1137637    -1.96   0.050    -.4458607    .0000849
      IncLow |  -.1295784   .0970087    -1.34   0.182     -.319712    .0605552
     IncHigh |   .0213912   .0933041     0.23   0.819    -.1614815     .204264
       copen |   .0891502   .0959172     0.93   0.353    -.0988441    .2771446
        city |    .033792    .086903     0.39   0.697    -.1365347    .2041188
      smoker |  -.2559043   .1114648    -2.30   0.022    -.4743714   -.0374372
     Hsmoker |   .1453342    .138561     1.05   0.294    -.1262403    .4169087
       _cons |   .3830157   .2234104     1.71   0.086    -.0548605     .820892
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
    /sigma_u |   .4479975   .0296959    15.09   0.000     .3897947    .5062004
    /sigma_e |   .4970773   .0157599    31.54   0.000     .4661885    .5279661
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
         rho |   .4482076   .0372372                      .3764982    .5216552
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------48-
Figure 1: First Level of the iMPL Elicitation Format-49-
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Appendix A:  Questionnaires
This appendix presents the survey questions asked of subjects in Parts I and IV of the
experiment, as well as the data coding for responses.  These are all translations of the original
Danish, available on request.
A.1 Part I of the Experiment: Socio-Demographic Questionnaire
In this survey most of the questions asked are descriptive.  The questions may seem
personal, but they will help us analyze the results of the experiments.  Your responses are completely
confidential.  Please think carefully about each question and give your best answer.
1. What is your age? ____________ years
2. What is your sex?
01 Male 02 Female
3. Where do you live?
01 Copenhagen including suburbs
02 Greater Copenhagen area
03 Municipality with towns of more than 100,000 inhabitants
04 Municipality with towns of 40,000 – 99,999 inhabitants
05 Municipality with towns of 20,000 – 39,999 inhabitants
06 Municipality with towns of 10,000 – 19,999 inhabitants
07 Other





05 Multi-ownership of residence, cooperative
06 Rented room
07 Official residence, etc.- A2 -
5. What has been your primary occupation during the last 12 months?













6. What is your highest level of education?
01 Basic school
02 General upper secondary education
03 Vocational upper secondary education
04 Vocational education and training
05 Short higher education
06 Medium higher education
07 Long higher education
A. Vocational education and training:
01 Commercial and clerical vocational courses
02 Metal manufacturing vocational courses
03 Construction vocational courses
04 Graphic vocational courses
05 Service-related vocational courses
06 Food-related vocational courses
07 Health-related auxiliary programs
08 Other vocational courses
B. Short higher education:
01 Social sciences and humanities
02 Technical and natural sciences
03 Health-related sciences
04 Other- A3 -
C. Medium higher education:
01 Social sciences
02 Technical and natural sciences
03 Health-related sciences
04 Educational courses and humanities
05 Officers
D. Long higher education:
01 Social sciences
02 Technical and natural sciences
03 Health-related sciences
04 Educational courses and humanities
05 Veterinary and agricultural courses
7. What are the characteristics of your household?
[A household is an economic unit, and it is defined as a group of persons who live in the
same residence and each person contributes to general expenditures.] 
01 Single under 30 years
02 Single 30 – 59 years
03 Single older than 59 years
04 2 adults, oldest person is under 30 years
05 2 adults, oldest person is 30 – 59 years
06 2 adults, oldest person is older than 59 years
07 Single with children, oldest child 0 – 9 years 
08 Single with children, oldest child 10 – 17 years 
09 2 adults with children, oldest child 0 – 9 years
10 2 adults with children, oldest child 10 – 17 years
11 Household with at least 3 adults





05 5 or more persons- A4 -
9. What was the amount of total income before tax earned in 2002 by all members of your
household (including children)?
[Consider all forms of income, including salaries, income from unincorporated business
enterprises, pension scheme contributions, interest earnings and dividends, retirement
benefits, student grants, scholarship support, social security, unemployment benefits,
parental support, alimony, child support, and other types of income.]
01 Below 150,000 kroner
02 150,000 – 299,999 kroner
03 300,000 – 499,999 kroner
04 500,000 – 799,999 kroner
05 800,000 kroner or more
10. How often do you participate in extreme sports? 
[Extreme sports include bungee-jumping, para-gliding, parachute jumping, gliding, rafting,
diving and other dangerous sports.]
01 Never
02 A few times
03 Occasionally
04 Often
05 Every chance I get
11. Do you currently smoke cigarettes?
01 No
02 Yes
A. If yes, how much do you smoke in one day? _______ cigarettes- A5 -
A.2 Questionnaire About Plans with Money in IDR Part
1. Suppose you win the money today.  What do you plan to do with the money you will
receive?
01 Spend 25% or less when you receive the money and save the rest
02 Spend 26 – 50% when you receive the money and save the rest
03 Spend 51 – 75% when you receive the money and save the rest
04 Spend more than 75% when you receive the money and save the rest
05 Spend 100% when you receive the money- A6 -
A.3  Part IV of the Experiment: Questionnaire About Finances
In this survey most of the questions asked are descriptive.  The questions may seem
personal, but they will help us analyze the results of the experiments.  Your responses are completely
confidential.  Please think carefully about each question and give your best answer.
1. Do you have a checking account?
01 No
02 Yes
A. If yes, what (annual) interest rate does your checking account currently earn?
_______ %
_______ Don't Know (88)
B. What is the current balance on your checking account?
01 5,000 kroner or less
02 5,001 – 10,000 kroner
03 10,001 – 25,000 kroner
04 25,001 – 50,000 kroner
05 More than 50,000 kroner
08 Don't Know
2. Do you have a line of credit?
01 No
02 Yes
A. If yes, what (annual) interest rate do you currently pay on your line of credit? 
________ %
________ Don't Know (88)
B. Do you ordinarily carry a balance from month to month on your line of credit?
01 No
02 Yes- A7 -
C. If yes, what is the balance owed on your line of credit?
01 1 – 500 kroner
02 501 – 1,000 kroner
03 1,001– 5,000 kroner
04 5,001 – 10,000 kroner
05 10,001 – 25,000 kroner
06 25,001 – 50,000 kroner
07 More than 50,000 kroner
08 Don't Know
3. Do you have a credit card?
01 No
02 Yes
A. If yes, what (annual) interest rate do you currently pay on your credit card? 
[If you have more than one credit card, please consider the highest interest rate on any credit
card with outstanding balances.]
________% 
_______ Don't Know (88)
C. What is the balance owed on this credit card?
01 1 – 500 kroner
02 501 – 1,000 kroner
03 1,001– 5,000 kroner
04 5,001 – 10,000 kroner
05 10,001 – 25,000 kroner
06 25,001 – 50,000 kroner
07 More than 50,000 kroner
08 Don't Know
3.1 Do you have more than one credit card?
01 No
02 Yes
C. What is the lowest interest rate you currently pay on any credit card with credit left.
________% 
_______ Don't Know (88)- A8 -
D. What is the balance owed on this credit card?
01 1 – 500 kroner
02 501 – 1,000 kroner
03 1,001– 5,000 kroner
04 5,001 – 10,000 kroner
05 10,001 – 25,000 kroner
06 25,001 – 50,000 kroner
07 More than 50,000 kroner
08 Don't Know
4. Do you have outstanding student loan balances?
01 No
02 Yes
A. If yes, what is the (annual) interest rate on your student loan balances?
______ %
______ Don't Know (88)
B. What is the balance owed on your student loan?
01 10,000 kroner or less
02 10,001 – 25,000 kroner
03 25,001 – 50,000 kroner
04 50,001 – 100,000 kroner
05 100,001 – 250,000 kroner
06 More than 250,000 kroner
08 Don't Know
5. Do you have a savings account, excluding contributions to pension schemes?
01 No
02 Yes
A. If yes, what (annual) interest rate does your savings account currently earn?
_______ %
_______ Don't Know (88)- A9 -
B. What is the balance on your savings account?
01 5,000 kroner or less
02 5,001 – 10,000 kroner
03 10,001 – 25,000 kroner
04 25,001 – 50,000 kroner
05 50,001 – 100,000 kroner
06 100,001 – 250,000 kroner
07 More than 250,000 kroner
08 Don't Know




A. If yes, what (annual) interest rate does your investment account currently earn?  
[If you have more than one of these investment accounts, please consider the account
currently earning the highest annual interest rate.]
______%
______ Don't Know (88)
B. What is the balance on this investment account?
01 5,000 kroner or less
02 5,001 – 10,000 kroner
03 10,001 – 25,000 kroner
04 25,001 – 50,000 kroner
05 50,001 – 100,000 kroner
06 100,001 – 250,000 kroner
07 More than 250,000 kroner
08 Don't Know
7. If you were to go to the bank to obtain a loan, line of credit, or credit card, what do you
think your chances would be of being approved?
01 At least 90% likely
02 At least 75% likely
03 At least 50% likely
04 Less than 50% likely- A10 -
8. How often do you find yourself short of cash between paychecks?
01 Every time
02 3 out of 4 times
03 2 out of 4 times
04 1 out of 4 times
05 Almost never























34 Don’t know- A11 -












10A. Now looking ahead, do you expect any major change in your family situation that will lead to





10B. Now looking ahead, do you expect any major change in your family situation that will lead to





10C. Now looking ahead, do you expect any major change in your family situation that will lead to




24 Don’t know- A12 -
10D. Now looking ahead, do you expect any major change in your family situation that will lead to





10E. Now looking ahead, do you expect any major change in your family situation that will lead to





10F. Now looking ahead, do you expect any major change in your family situation that will lead to





11A. Do you expect any major change in your family situation that will lead to higher earnings or





11B. Do you expect any major change in your family situation that will lead to higher earnings or




14 Don’t know- A13 -
11C. Do you expect any major change in your family situation that will lead to higher earnings or





11D. Do you expect any major change in your family situation that will lead to higher earnings or





11E. Do you expect any major change in your family situation that will lead to higher earnings or





11F. Do you expect any major change in your family situation that will lead to higher earnings or





12A. On balance, do you think that you and your family will be better off or worse off financially
1 month from now?
01 Will be better off
02 Same
03 Will be worse off
04 Don’t know- A14 -
12B. On balance, do you think that you and your family will be better off or worse off financially
4 months from now?
11 Will be better off
12 Same
13 Will be worse off
14 Don’t know
12C. On balance, do you think that you and your family will be better off or worse off financially
6 months from now?
21 Will be better off
22 Same
23 Will be worse off
24 Don’t know
12D. On balance, do you think that you and your family will be better off or worse off financially
12 months from now?
31 Will be better off
32 Same
33 Will be worse off
34 Don’t know
12E. On balance, do you think that you and your family will be better off or worse off financially
18 months from now?
41 Will be better off
42 Same
43 Will be worse off
44 Don’t know
12F. On balance, do you think that you and your family will be better off or worse off financially
24 months from now?
51 Will be better off
52 Same
53 Will be worse off
54 Don’t know- A15 -
13A. Turning to the economic conditions in the country as a whole, would you say that at the





13B. Turning to the economic conditions in the country as a whole, would you say that at the





13C. Turning to the economic conditions in the country as a whole, would you say that at the





13D. Turning to the economic conditions in the country as a whole, would you say that at the





13E. Turning to the economic conditions in the country as a whole, would you say that at the




44 Don’t know- A16 -
13F. Turning to the economic conditions in the country as a whole, would you say that at the





14A. Do you think that there will be more or less unemployment during the next 1 month?
01 More unemployment
02 About the same
03 Less unemployment
04 Don’t know
14B. Do you think that there will be more or less unemployment during the next 4 months?
11 More unemployment
12 About the same
13 Less unemployment
14 Don’t know
14C. Do you think that there will be more or less unemployment during the next 6 months?
21 More unemployment
22 About the same
23 Less unemployment
24 Don’t know
14D. Do you think that there will be more or less unemployment during the next 12 months?
31 More unemployment
32 About the same
33 Less unemployment
34 Don’t know
14E. Do you think that there will be more or less unemployment during the next 18 months?
41 More unemployment
42 About the same
43 Less unemployment
44 Don’t know- A17 -
14F. Do you think that there will be more or less unemployment during the next 24 months?
51 More unemployment
52 About the same
53 Less unemployment
54 Don’t know
15A. Do you think that interest rates for borrowing money will go up or go down during the next
1 month?
01 Go up
02 Stay the same
03 Go down
04 Don’t know
15B. Do you think that interest rates for borrowing money will go up or go down during the next
4 months?
11 Go up
12 Stay the same
13 Go down
14 Don’t know
15C. Do you think that interest rates for borrowing money will go up or go down during the next
6 months?
21 Go up
22 Stay the same
23 Go down
24 Don’t know
15D. Do you think that interest rates for borrowing money will go up or go down during the next
12 months?
31 Go up
32 Stay the same
33 Go down
34 Don’t know- A18 -
15E. Do you think that interest rates for borrowing money will go up or go down during the next
18 months?
41 Go up
42 Stay the same
43 Go down
44 Don’t know
15F. Do you think that interest rates for borrowing money will go up or go down during the next
24 months?
51 Go up
52 Stay the same
53 Go down
54 Don’t know53  Harrison, Lau and Williams [2002] relied on the sample frames developed by the Danish Social
Research Institute (SFI) for their sample, and also used SFI personnel to conduct the field experiments. 
Given the substantial cost of using such survey firms, we decided to undertake the sampling and experiments
ourselves.  SFI had a sample of around 5,000 participants from which they picked subjects for the previous
experiments.  Their show up rate among recruited persons was 85%, which we viewed as quite high for the
field, but those persons had previously been interviewed several times by the SFI. 
- A19 -
Appendix B: Sample Design
This appendix adds detail to the documentation of the sample design presented in the paper.
B.1 Overall Design
The sample for the field experiments was designed to generate a representative sample of the
adult Danish population.
53  There were six steps in the construction of the sample:
• First, a random sample of 25,000 Danes was drawn from the Danish Civil Registration
Office in January 2003.  Only Danes born between 1927 and 1983 were included, thereby
restricting the age range of the target population to between 19 and 75.  For each person in
this random sample we had access to their name, address, county, municipality, birth date,
and sex.  16 of the records had no name and address and were dropped, and another 12 of
the records had no address and were also dropped.
• Second, we dropped 17 municipalities (including one county) from the population, due to
them being located in extraordinarily remote locations.  The population represented in these
locations amounts to less than 2% of the Danish population, and only 493 individuals in our
sample from the civil registry.
• Third, we assigned each county either 1 session or 2 sessions, in rough proportionality to the
population of the county.  In total we assigned 21 sessions.  Each session consisted of two
sub-sessions at the same locale and date, one at 5pm and another at 8pm, and subjects were
allowed to choose which sub-session suited them best.
• Fourth, we divided 6 counties into two sub-groups because the distance between some
municipalities in the county and the location of the session would be too large.  A random
draw was made between the two sub-groups and the location selected, where the weights
reflect the relative size of the population in September 2002. 
• Fifth, we picked the first 30 or 60 randomly sorted records within each county, depending
on the number of sessions allocated to that county.  This provided a sub-sample of 600,
which we then contacted by mail.
• Sixth, we sent out 600 invitations to attend a session, offering each person a choice of times
for the session.  Response rates were low in some counties and another 64 invitations were
sent out.  We signed up everyone that gave a positive response, and our final recruited
sample was 268.  In the end, we had 253 persons actually turn up for the sessions. 
We explain below how we use this information to generate sample weights for the statistical analysis.- A20 -
B.2 List of Danish Municipalities and County Codes
Each of the 275 municipalities and 15 counties in the sample has a code, listed below.  The
17 municipalities that were dropped due to logistical problems were: 401, 403, 405, 407, 409, 443,
475, 481, 487, 493, 501, 523, 535, 563, 741, 675 and 825.  The 6 counties allocated two sessions
were: 1, 15, 20, 42, 70 and 80.  The 6 counties divided into two sub-groups were: 30, 35, 50, 60, 65
and 76.
Name County code Municipality code Sub-group





















































Vestsjællands Amt 30 30
Bjergsted 30 301 2
Dianalund 30 303 1
Dragsholm 30 305 2
Fuglebjerg 30 307 1
Gørlev 30 309 1
Hashøj 30 311 1
Haslev 30 313 1
Holbæk 30 315 2
Hvidebæk 30 317 1
Høng 30 319 1
Jernløse 30 321 2
Kalundborg 30 323 1
Korsør 30 325 1
Nykøbing-Rørvig 30 327 2
Ringsted 30 329 1
Skælskør 30 331 1
Slagelse 30 333 1
Sorø 30 335 1
Stenlille 30 337 1
Svinninge 30 339 2
Tornved 30 341 2
Trundholm 30 343 2
Tølløse 30 345 2
Storstrøms Amt 35 35
Fakse 35 351 3
Fladså 35 353 3
Holeby 35 355 4
Holmegaard 35 357 3
Højreby 35 359 4
Langebæk 35 361 3
Maribo 35 363 4
Møn 35 365 3
Nakskov 35 367 4
Nykøbing-Falster 35 369 4
Nysted 35 371 4
Næstved 35 373 3
Nørre Alslev 35 375 4
Præstø 35 377 3
Ravnsborg 35 379 4
Rudbjerg 35 381 4- A22 -
Rødby 35 383 4
Rønnede 35 385 3
Sakskøbing 35 387 4
Stevns 35 389 3
Stubbekøbing 35 391 4
Suså 35 393 3
Sydfalster 35 395 4
Vordingborg 35 397 3






(Uden For Kommuner) 411

































Sønderjyllands Amt 50 50
Augustenborg 50 501 6
Bov 50 503 6
Bredebro 50 505 6- A23 -
Broager 50 507 6
Christiansfeld 50 509 5
Gram 50 511 5
Gråsten 50 513 6
Haderslev 50 515 5
Højer 50 517 6
Lundtoft 50 519 6
Løgumkloster 50 521 6
Nordborg 50 523 6
Nørre Rangstrup 50 525 5
Rødding 50 527 5
Rødekro 50 529 6
Skærbæk 50 531 5
Sundeved 50 533 6
Sydals 50 535 6
Sønderborg 50 537 6
Tinglev 50 539 6
Tønder 50 541 6
Vojens 50 543 5
Aabenraa 50 545 6















Vejle Amt 60 60
Brædstrup 60 601 8
Børkop 60 603 7
Egtved 60 605 7
Fredericia 60 607 7
Gedved 60 609 8
Give 60 611 7
Hedensted 60 613 8
Horsens 60 615 8
Jelling 60 617 7
Juelsminde 60 619 8
Kolding 60 621 7
Lunderskov 60 623 7
Nørre Snede 60 625 8
Tørring-Uldum 60 627 8
Vamdrup 60 629 7
Vejle 60 631 7- A24 -
Ringkøbing Amt 65 65
Aulum-Haderup 65 651 9
Brande 65 653 9
Egvad 65 655 9
Herning 65 657 9
Holmsland 65 659 9
Holstebro 65 661 10
Ikast 65 663 9
Lemvig 65 665 10
Ringkøbing 65 667 9
Skjern 65 669 9
Struer 65 671 10
Thyborøn-Harboøre 65 673 10
Thyholm 65 675 10
Trehøje 65 677 9
Ulfborg-Vemb 65 679 10
Videbæk 65 681 9
Vinderup 65 683 10
Åskov 65 685 9



























Viborg Amt 76 76
Bjerringbro 76 761 11
Fjends 76 763 11
Hanstholm 76 765 12
Hvorslev 76 767 11
Karup 76 769 11- A25 -
Kjellerup 76 771 11
Morsø 76 773 12
Møldrup 76 775 11
Sallingsund 76 777 11
Skive 76 779 11
Spøttrup 76 781 11
Sundsøre 76 783 11
Sydthy 76 785 12
Thisted 76 787 12
Tjele 76 789 11
Viborg 76 791 11
Aalestrup 76 793 11



























Aars 80 861- A26 -
B.3 Map of Denmark- A27 -
B.4 Recruitment Procedures
We sent out 600 invitations to attend a session in the first recruitment wave, offering each
person a choice of two times for the session.  The first 30 or 60 randomly sorted records were
picked within each county, depending on the number of sessions allocated to that county.  Response
rates were low in some counties and another 45 and 19 invitations were sent out in the second and
third wave, respectively.  A total of 664 invitations were sent out. 
The first wave of invitations were sent out four weeks before the first session was scheduled,
and we asked people to reply within one week.  The second and third waves of invitations were sent
out two and three weeks after the first wave, respectively.
Number of invitations across counties 
County Wave1 Wave2 Wave3 Total
16 0 6 0
15 60 60
20 60 12 72
25 30 6 36
30 30 7 1 38
35 30 20 50
42 60 60
50 30 8 38






Total 600 45 19 664
We signed up everyone that gave a positive response, and our final recruited sample was 268. 
The response rate was 42.5 percent for the first wave, 20 percent for the second wave and 22.1
percent for the third wave.   
Number of recruited persons across counties 
County Wave1 Wave2 Wave3 Total
13 1 3 1
15 28 28
20 25 1 26
25 12 12
30 11 1 1 13
35 6 7 13
42 25 25
50 12 12
55 10 3 13
60 15 15




Total 255 9 4 268
Attendance at the experimental sessions was extraordinarily high.  A total of 253 persons
participated in the experiments.  Four persons turned up for their session, but were not able to
participate in the experiments.  The first person suffered from dementia and could not remember
the instructions; the second person was a 76 year old woman who was not able to control the mouse
and eventually gave up; the third person had just won the world championship in sailing and was too
busy with interviews to stay for two hours; and the fourth person was sent home because too many
people showed up (one person came unexpected, and we had only ten laptops available at that
session).  Four persons showed up unexpected and participated in the experiments. 
Certain events might have plausibly triggered some of the no-shows: for example, 3 men did
not turn up on June 11, 2003, but that was the night that the Danish national soccer team played a
qualifying game for the European championships against Luxembourg that had been unscheduled
when we picked session dates. 
Number of people attending across counties 
County Wave1 Wave2 Wave3 Total
13 0 3 0
15 26 26
20 23 1 24
25 12 12
30 9 1 10
35 6 7 13
42 23 23
50 12 12






Total 240 8 5 253
We assigned each county either 1 session or 2 sessions, in rough proportionality to the
population of the county.  We assigned initially 20 sessions.  Each session consisted of two sub-
sessions at the same locale and date, one at 5pm and another at 8pm, and subjects were allowed to
choose which sub-session suited them best.  Some late sessions had only one or two subjects signed
up, and we contacted these subjects by phone and asked them to participate in the early session. 
One additional session was held on June 24 because midsummer eve on June 23 was unscheduled
when we picked the session dates.  Subjects scheduled for the June 23 session were contacted by
phone and could choose which date suited them best. 
The letter of invitation included an answer form and a prepaid envelope, and they were
asked to answer within one week.  The same day we received the answer form, a reply letter was sent- A29 -
confirming their participation in the meeting at the given location, date and time.  Every recruited
subject was reminded by mail or phone within one week before the meeting.  Both procedures were
used for the first three sessions, and attendance was almost 100 percent at these sessions.  We
reminded subjects by mail for the remaining sessions because this procedure is more convenient. 
Subjects were provided with three treatments in the risk aversion task.  The symmetric
treatment offered ten initial probabilities of 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, ...,0.9 and 1.  In one case the menu was
skewed to lower elicited RA and offered six initial probabilities of 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7 and 1.  In
another case the menu was skewed to increase elicited RA and offered six initial probabilities of 0.3,
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































B.4 Letters of Invitation and Correspondence
These documents are translations from the original Danish, available on request.  They were
sent out under the letterhead of the Ministry of Business and Economic Affairs.
Economic decisions
Dear ______________
In daily life you make a number of decisions on how to spend your money. Some decisions concern
the future. Should you consume now, or should you save the money and consume later? Should you
buy or rent a home? Should you work or get additional education? To find out how Danes respond
to these questions, the Ministry of Economic and Business Affairs will carry out a survey. The
survey is financed by the Social Research Council and is conducted by researchers from the
ministry’s research unit and from the United States. This is the second analysis of this kind in
Denmark.  
You are chosen to participate
200 persons participate from all over the country. We have found the names by random choice from
the Central Office of Civil Registration. The survey implies that a small number of people will get
together and answer the questions. We would therefore like to invite you to participate in one of
these meetings that will take place: 
5:00 pm or 8:00 pm, ______ day, ___/___ 2003 at: _________________________________
                                                                                   _________________________________
We will ask you to mark your preferred time for the meeting in the attached answer form. 
You can win a significant amount
To cover travel costs, you will receive 500 kroner at the end of the meeting. Moreover, each
participant will have a 10 percent chance of receiving an amount between 50 and 4,500 kroner in the
first part of the survey, and this amount will also be paid at the end of the meeting. In the second
part of the survey, each participant will have a 10 percent chance of receiving at least 3,000 kroner.
A random choice will decide who win the money in both parts of the survey. All amounts are
subject to personal income taxation and will be recorded at the tax authorities. - A33 -
It is important that you answer…
But it is voluntary to participate. Your answers will be strictly confidential, and the results will be
published in a way that no single person can be identified. The meeting will last at most 2 hours. We
ask you to return the attached answer form within a week. Please find attached a stamped envelope. 
If you have any questions or would like to know more about the survey, please call Steffen Andersen
at 35 46 63 21 or the interview leader, see below. If you have problems with travel expenses, please
contact the interview leader and travel arrangements will be made.
With best regards,
Thank you for your help
Morten I. Lau   _______________
Interview leader Interview leader
Tel.:  35 46 62 54
Economic decisions
I, ___________________, hereby confirm that I would like to participate in the meeting 
______day, the ___/___ 2003 at: _________________________________
                                                      _________________________________
17:00 hours _____
20:00 hours _____
Please mark your preferred time for the meeting.
I acknowledge that my travel costs are covered by 500 kroner, and all amounts paid at the meeting
are subject to personal income taxation. In case we need to contact you, please provide your phone
number below.  - A34 -





Thank you for confirming your participation in the meeting:
17:00/20:00 hours, ______ day, the ___/___ 2003 at: __________________________________
                                                                                      __________________________________
The meeting will begin with a short introduction of the survey, and we will then ask you to answer a
number of questions. We will serve coffee, tea and cake. The meeting will last at most 2 hours. The
500 kroner to cover your travel costs and prizes in the first part of the survey will be paid before you
leave the meeting. 






We hereby confirm that the meeting will take place:
17:00/20:00 hours, ______ day, the ___/___ 2003 at: __________________________________
                                                                                      __________________________________
The meeting will begin with a short introduction of the survey, and we will then ask you to answer a- A35 -
number of questions. We will serve coffee, tea and cake. The meeting will last at most 2 hours. The
500 kroner to cover your travel costs and prizes in the first part of the survey will be paid before you
leave the meeting. 
With best regards, 
________________________
Morten I. Lau
Interview leader- A36 -
Appendix C: Experimenter Script
This appendix reproduces the script followed by the experimenters during the experimental
sessions. This script contains the instructions on the subjects’ computer screens, as well as additional
interviewer directions and explanations that were necessary for the conduct of the sessions. 
Welcome announcement
[Give letter of invitation to subjects.]
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this survey.  The survey is financed by the Social
Science Research Council and concerns the economics of decision making. 
Recall from the letter of invitation that you will be paid 500 kroner for your participation to
cover travel costs.  In order to qualify for this compensation you need to stay the full two hours of
this session.  Is everyone able to stay for the full two hours?  Please make sure your mobile phones
are turned off to avoid interruptions during the meeting.  
[If somebody is not, take them outside. Give them 100 kroner and send them home.]
You will be given instructions and practice opportunities for the tasks today on the
computer screen in front of you.  
[Give handouts for Part II to subjects: computer screen examples and practice record
sheets.]
Before we start I would like to ask one person to come up here and inspect the two bingo
cages that we will use several times during today’s session.  Please verify that we have here 100 balls
numbered from 1 to 100, and here 10 balls numbered 1 to 10.  I will now ask you to place these balls
into the bingo cages.  Please take your seat again. 
I will now come around and enter your subject ID numbers on the computers.  We will then
read through the instructions together.  Please wait for me to finish.
WELCOME TO THE EXPERIMENT
THESE ARE YOUR INSTRUCTIONS
This is an experiment in the economics of decision making.  Your participation in this
experiment is voluntary.  However, we think you will find the experiment interesting.  You will be
paid for your participation and you could make a considerable amount of additional money.  The
instructions are simple and you will benefit from following them carefully.  Please take a few
minutes to read them through together with me.
In this experiment you may receive some money from us in addition to the guaranteed
participation fee.  How much you receive will depend partly on chance and partly on the choices you
make in series of decision-problems which will be presented to you in a few minutes.- A37 -
The problems are not designed to test you.  What we want to know is what choices you
would make in them.  The only right answer is what you really would choose.  That is why the
problems give you the chance of winning real money.
The experiment will proceed in four parts.
Part I consists of some questions about yourself.  This information is for our records only. 
Our study records and the published results of our research will not identify any individual or the
choice he or she made in any way.  All records will be linked to an anonymous subject ID only.
Part II is a decision problem in which chance may play a part.  Your decision problem
requires you to make a series of choices between two options.  This is described in more detail later.
Part III is a different decision problem in which chance may play a part.  We will describe
this further after you have completed the second part.
Part IV consists of some additional questions about yourself.  Again, this information is for
our records only and confidentiality of your responses is assured. 
At the end we will ask you to step aside for a moment and then call you back in, one at a
time, to pay you in private. 
At this time we ask that you answer the questions for Part I.  Just click the OK button to go
on. 
Password 1: 1
Instructions for Part II
We will now continue with Part II of the experiment.
Each person in this room will have a chance to receive an additional large sum of money.  If
you are selected to receive this sum of money, you will have a choice between two payment options;
option A or option B.  Each person will have a 1-in-10 chance of receiving the money.  The
selection will be done using a ten-sided die.  If the number 0 is drawn you will receive the money at
the end of the meeting.  If any other number is drawn you will not receive the money. 
You will be asked to make a series of choices in a decision problem which may have multiple
levels.  The table shown on page 1 in the handout is an illustration of what Level 1 of the decision
problem will look like on your computer screen.  This handout contains several other screen images
we will mention later.
This screen illustration shows ten decisions listed on the left side, in the column marked
Decision.  Each decision is a paired choice between “Option A” and “Option B.” You will be asked
to make a choice between these two options in each decision row.- A38 -
Before you start thinking about your choice, let me explain how your choice affects your
earnings.  Earnings depend partly on the outcome of a spin of the bingo cage you see in this room. 
When the bingo cage is spun, a single ball will be randomly picked from all the balls in the bingo
cage, and the number on the ball will in part determine your earnings.  The bingo cage contains 100
balls which are individually numbered from 1 to 100, so any number between 1 and 100 is equally
likely to be chosen.
Please look at decision 1 at the top of the table.  Option A pays $100 if the bingo ball is
numbered 10 or lower, and it pays $80 if the bingo ball is numbered 11 or higher.  This means that
there is a 10-in-100 chance of getting $100 and a 90-in-100 chance of getting $80. 
Option B yields $170 if the bingo ball is numbered 10 or lower , and it pays $5 if the bingo
ball is numbered 11 or higher. 
The difference between the two amounts in option A is smaller than the difference between
the two amounts in option B.
The other decisions are similar, except that as you move down the table the chances of the
higher payoff for each option increase.  In fact, for decision 10 in the bottom row, the bingo cage
will not be needed since each option pays the highest payoff for sure.  So your choice in decision 10
is simply between $100 or $170.
For each of the ten decisions, you will be asked to choose Option A or Option B by clicking
on the appropriate button.  These buttons are shown on the right of the screen illustration.  For
some decisions you may not care whether you receive Option A or B, in which case you should click
the button labeled “I” for “Indifference.” 
We expect that you will be making one out of four kinds of decisions:
• You may prefer Option A for all decision rows;
• You may be Indifferent between Option A and Option B for all decision rows;
• You may prefer Option B for all decision rows; or
• You may prefer Option A for some decision rows, Option B for some decision rows, and be
Indifferent for other decision rows.
Which kind of decision you make is entirely up to you.
If you select Option A for all decision rows, or if you indicate Indifference for any of the
decision rows, there will be no further choices to be made by you in this problem before
determining your earnings.
If you select Option B for all decisions rows, or if you switch from Option A to Option B at
some point, we will give you a Level 2 task before determining your earnings.  The Level 2 task
involves making choices in the Level 2 table illustrated on page 2 in the handout. 
The Level 2 table shows you eleven other decisions listed in a similar way.  They are
arranged in the same way as the ten decisions in the Level 1 table, but they focus in on the decisions
that were made in Level 1.- A39 -
Assume that someone in Level 1 has selected Option A for rows 1-3 and Option B for rows
4-10.  This means that this person prefers Option A when the chances of earning the higher amount
is 30-in-100 or less, but prefers Option B when the chances of earning the higher amount are 40-in-
100 or more.  Level 2 then asks this person to choose between Option A and Option B for chances
between 30-in-100 and 40-in-100.  Thus, row 1 in Level 2 corresponds to a chance of 30-in-100 for
the higher amount, and row 2 to a chance of 31-in-100 for the higher amount, and so on until the
last row shows a 40-in-100 chance of earning the higher amount.  Thus Level 2 just provides more
detail in the range of choices this person indicated in Level 1.
Notice that the chance of winning the higher amount in Level 1 increases by intervals of 10-
in-100, or 10 percentage points, as you move from decision row 1 to decision row 2.  The same
increase in chances applies to each row in Level 1.  Notice also that the decisions displayed in Level
2 are determined by the row where you first choose Option B over Option A in Level 1.  Level 2
simply takes the interval between the point where you last chose A and first chose B, and divides
that interval of 10 percentage points into 11 narrower intervals.  Thus the chance of winning the
higher amount in Level 2 increases by intervals of 1-in-100, or 1 percentage point, as you move from
decision row 1 to decision row 2. 
As you can see, you have a minimum of 10 decisions to make.  You will have 21 decisions if
you make the kind of decision in Level 1 that moves you to Level 2.  Nevertheless, we will pay you
for only one of these decisions.  After you have made all of your choices we will use the bingo cage
to select which decision will be used to determine your payment.  To decide which decision row will
determine your payment, we will spin the  bingo cage you see in this room and withdraw one ball. 
The bingo cage contains 10 balls, numbered individually from 1 to 10.  The number on the bingo
ball determines the decision row you will play out.  Thus if the number is 2, you will play out
decision row 2.  If the number is 9, you will play out decision 9.  Each decision row is therefore
equally likely to be chosen.
In the example above, if the number “4” bingo ball is withdrawn, that will take this person
to Level 2 since this person switched from A to B on row 4 in Level 1.  In such a case, we will need
to add a number 11 ball to the bingo cage and spin the cage again to determine which decision in
Level 2 is binding.
Once we know which choice is binding, we will spin the bingo cage that contains 100 balls
to see if you will receive the higher amount or the lower amount for the choice that you made.  Thus
if you chose Option A, you would be paid the appropriate amount in Option A; if you chose Option
B, you would be paid the appropriate amount in Option B.
If the number on the bingo ball corresponds to a row for which you have expressed
Indifference, we will first let yet another spin of the bingo cage determine which choice of A or B
will determine your earnings.  In this case a number between 1 and 50 means that A will be chosen,
and a number between 51 and 100 will mean that B is chosen.  Hence each option has an equal
chance of determining your earnings if you expressed Indifference.  This will be done before we spin
the bingo cage to determine whether you will be paid the high or the low amount.
Password 2: 2- A40 -
Practice Examples
EXAMPLE 1
To make these procedures very clear to you we are going to go through a few examples.  In
these examples we will show you how we will spin the bingo cage and how the number on the bingo
ball will determine the decision that is binding and then the payment you will receive.  You will not
be paid for these practice examples, but they will help you understand how the procedures work
when you do make decisions for payment.
As you can see on the screen illustration on page 1, we used a decision table that is already
filled in.  At this time we ask that you fill in answers on your computer that correspond to this
illustration.  On the computer you will see only the Level 1 table first.  The Level 2 table will be
shown on a subsequent screen.  When you have finished filling in Level 1, but before you click the
submit button at the bottom on the screen, please raise your hand and we will come and verify that
you have done it correctly.
PLEASE WAIT UNTIL THE EXPERIMENTER ANNOUNCES THAT THE
PRACTICE IS CONTINUING.
Since the illustration is for a case where somebody has selected A for some decision rows
and then switched to B in decision row 4, the next screen shows you Level 2.  In this illustration
Option A was selected in Level 1 when the chance for high earnings was 30-in-100 and Option B
was selected when the chance was 40-in-100.  So Level 2 corresponds to chances between these two
values.
Please fill in answers on your computer that correspond to the illustration of the Level 2
table for Example 1 in your handout.  When you have finished filling in the table, but before you
click the submit button at the bottom on the screen, please raise your hand and we will come and
verify that you have done it correctly.
PLEASE WAIT UNTIL THE EXPERIMENTER ANNOUNCES THAT THE
PRACTICE IS CONTINUING.
We are now going to illustrate a number of different possible outcomes from the spin of the
bingo cage.  Remember that we are going to spin the cage both to determine which decision row is
the binding one, and also to determine what the payment is for that row, conditional on the choice
between Option A, Option B and Indifference that you made.
Password 3: 4
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We will first spin the bingo cage with 10 balls to determine which decision row in Level 1 is- A41 -
the binding one for payment.  This is just an illustration so we are not paying for these decisions. 
[SPIN CAGE WITH 10 BALLS.]
[FOR BALL NOT EQUAL TO 4:]
Look at the table on page 1.  The number on the bingo ball is X, and it is NOT the first row
for which option B is selected.  The decisions made in Level 2 will therefore not matter for the
payments.  Since the number on the bingo ball is X, the choice made for decision row X is the
binding choice. 
For decision row X the choice was [A OR B]. 
Now we will spin the bingo cage with 100 balls to determine whether you would receive the
higher amount or the lower amount. 
[SPIN CAGE WITH 100 BALLS.]
The number on the bingo ball is Z.  Since you chose [A OR B] in Decision X, you would be
paid [amount]. 
[SPIN CAGE WITH 100 BALLS 10 TIMES.]
[FOR BALL EQUAL TO 4:]
Since the number on the bingo ball is 4, decision row 4 will determine earnings.  However,
in this illustration decision row 4 is the first row where Option B is chosen, 
which takes us to Level 2.  We will therefore spin the cage again to select the row in Level 2 that will
determine earnings. 
Since there are 11 rows, we will add a bingo ball with number “11” to the  bingo cage.
[SPIN CAGE WITH 11 BALLS.]
Since the number on the bingo ball is X, the choice made for decision row X in Level 2 is
the binding choice. 
For decision row X the choice was [A OR B]. 
Now we will spin the bingo cage with 100 balls to determine whether you would receive the
higher amount or the lower amount. 
[SPIN CAGE WITH 100 BALLS.]
The number on the bingo ball is Z.  Since you chose [A OR B] in decision row X of Level 2,
you would be paid [amount].
[SPIN CAGE WITH 100 BALLS 10 TIMES.]
[REPEAT EXERCISE ONE MORE TIME AND COVER BOTH EXAMPLES]
EXAMPLE 2- A42 -
We have shown you examples of our procedures for the case where an individual chooses A
for some decisions and B for others.  We also expect some of you will be indifferent between
Option A and Option B for some decisions.  How will earnings be determined in that case?
The table for Example 2 on page 4 in your handout illustrates a case where someone is
indifferent between Option A and Option B at Decision 7 and 8. 
Please fill in answers on your computer that correspond to this illustration of the decision
table.  When you have finished filling in the table, but before you click the submit button at the
bottom on the screen, please raise your hand and we will come and verify that you have done it
correctly.
Again, if you indicate Indifference for any of the decision rows, there will be no further
choices to be made by you in this problem before determining your earnings.  And  we will again
spin the bingo cage to select the decision row which will determine your payment.  This works
exactly as before, except in the case where the spin of the bingo cage selects a decision for which
you have indicated you don’t care whether you are paid under Option A or Option B.  In that case,
we will have to spin the bingo cage again to choose whether you will be paid under Option A or
Option B for that decision.  To make sure you clearly understand this situation, we will now
illustrate those procedures.  
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We will first spin the bingo cage with 10 balls to determine which decision row in Level 1 is
the binding one for payment.  This is just an illustration so we are not paying for these decisions. 
[SPIN BINGO CAGE WITH 10 BALLS.] 
[FOR BALL NOT EQUAL TO INDIFFERENCE ROW (7 OR 8):]
Look at the table on page 4.  Since the number on the bingo ball is X, the choice made for
decision row X is the binding choice. 
For decision row X the choice was [A OR B]. 
Now we will spin the bingo cage with 100 balls to determine whether you would receive the
higher amount or the lower amount. 
[SPIN CAGE WITH 100 BALLS.]
The number on the bingo ball is Z.  Since you chose [A OR B] in Decision X, you would be
paid [amount]. - A43 -
[FOR BALL EQUAL TO INDIFFERENCE ROW (7 OR 8):]
The number of the ball is [7 or 8].  Since the row selected is one for which you made a
choice of Indifference, we will need to perform an extra selection before determining whether
payments will be based on the high or the low amounts.  This extra selection will determine whether
Option A or Option B will decide earnings.  We will spin the bingo cage with 100 balls, and a
number between 1 and 50 means that A will be chosen, and a number between 51 and 100 will mean
that B is chosen. 
[SPIN CAGE WITH 100 BALLS.]
For decision row X the choice was [A OR B].  
Now we will spin the bingo cage with 100 balls to determine whether you would receive the
higher amount or the lower amount. 
[SPIN CAGE WITH 100 BALLS]
The number on the bingo ball is Z.  Since the option selected was [A OR B], you would be
paid [amount]. 
[REPEAT EXERCISE ONE MORE TIME AND COVER BOTH EXAMPLES]
EXAMPLE 3
We will now go through one final example.  Please refer to page 6 and 7 in your handouts for screen
images of what choices are to be made in this example.
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We will first spin the bingo cage with 10 balls to determine which decision row in Level 1 is
the binding one for payment.  This is just an illustration so we are not paying for these decisions. 
[SPIN CAGE WITH 10 BALLS.]
[FOR BALL NOT EQUAL TO 6:]
Look at the table on page 6.  The number on the bingo ball is X, and it is NOT the first row
for which option B is selected.  The decisions made in Level 2 will therefore not matter for the
payments.  Since the number on the bingo ball is X, the choice made for decision row X is the
binding choice. 
For decision row X the choice was [A OR B]. - A44 -
Now we will spin the bingo cage with 100 balls to determine whether you would receive the
higher amount or the lower amount. 
[SPIN CAGE WITH 100 BALLS.]
The number on the bingo ball is Z.  Since you chose [A OR B] in Decision X, you would be
paid [amount]. 
[FOR BALL EQUAL TO 6:]
Since the number on the bingo ball is 6, decision row 6 will determine earnings.  However,
in this illustration decision row 6 is the first row where Option B is chosen, which takes us to Level
2.  We will therefore spin the cage again to select the row in Level 2 that will determine earnings. 
Since there are 11 rows, we will add a bingo ball that is numbered with an “11" to the  bingo
cage.
[SPIN THE CAGE WITH 11 BALLS.]
[FOR BALL NOT EQUAL TO INDIFFERENCE ROW (3):]
Look at the table on page 7.  Since the number on the bingo ball is X, the choice made for
decision row X in Level 2 is the binding choice. 
For decision row X the choice was [A OR B].  
Now we will spin the bingo cage with 100 balls to determine whether you would receive the
higher amount or the lower amount. 
[SPIN CAGE WITH 100 BALLS.]
The number on the bingo ball is Z.  Since you chose [A OR B] in Decision X, you would be
paid [amount]. 
[FOR BALL EQUAL TO INDIFFERENCE ROW (3):]
The number of the ball is 3.  Since the row selected is the one for which you made the
choice of Indifference, we will need to perform an extra selection before determining whether
payments will be based on the high or the low amounts.  This extra selection will determine whether
Option A or Option B will decide earnings.  We will spin the bingo cage with 100 balls, and a
number between 1 and 50 means that A will be chosen, and a number between 51 and 100 will mean
that B is chosen. 
[SPIN CAGE WITH 100 BALLS.]
For decision row X in Level 2 the choice was [A OR B].  
Now we will spin the bingo cage with 100 balls to determine whether you would receive the
higher amount or the lower amount. 
[SPIN CAGE WITH 100 BALLS]
The number on the bingo ball is Z.  Since the option selected was [A OR B], you would be
paid [amount].- A45 -
[REPEAT EXERCISE ONE MORE TIME]
There is one final detail we need to explain.  You will be asked to complete four decision
problems as explained above.  These four decision problems will be exactly the same except that the
high and low amounts will differ.  Although you will complete four problems, we will not pay you
for all four problems.  After you have completed the entire set of decision problems we will need to
spin the bingo cage again to determine which of the problems we will use for your payment.  
If the bingo ball is numbered 1 to 25, you will be paid for problem 1. 
If the bingo ball is numbered 26 to 50, you will be paid for problem 2.
If the bingo ball is numbered 51 to 75, you will be paid for problem 3.
If the bingo ball is numbered 76 to 100, you will be paid for problem 4.
Once we have selected that problem, we will then spin the bingo cages as explained above. 
It is important to understand that you will have to finish making your choices for all four
problems before we start spinning the bingo cages.  In addition, in each of the four decision
problems there may be up to three levels of tables rather than just two levels. 
Are there any questions? 
To further illustrate our procedures, we will now continue with an example where the
payments are indicated in chocolate kisses.  You will be asked to make choices in one problem. 
After you have completed your choices we will perform all the draws using the bingo cages to
determine your payments. 
Each person will have a 1-in-10 chance of receiving the chocolate kisses.  The selection will
be done using a ten-sided die.  If the number 0 is drawn you will receive the chocolate immediately. 
If any other number is drawn you will not receive the chocolate. 
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The next two images that appear on the computer screen show the results of your choices
and will help us determine your earnings.  All records will be linked to an anonymous ID-number
only. 
We will first spin the bingo cage to determine which decision rows in Level 1 and Level 2 are
the binding ones for payment. 
[SPIN CAGE WITH 10 BALLS.]
[SPIN CAGE WITH 11 BALLS.]- A46 -
We will next spin the bingo cage with 100 balls to determine whether Option A or Option B
will decide earnings in case you are indifferent.  A number between 1 and 50 means that A will be
chosen, and a number between 51 and 100 will mean that B is chosen. 
[SPIN CAGE WITH 100 BALLS.]
We will then spin the bingo cage with 100 balls to determine whether you will receive the
higher amount or the lower amount. 
[SPIN CAGE WITH 100 BALLS.]
Finally, we will now come around and roll the ten-sided die to determine who will receive
the chocolate kisses.  If the number 0 is drawn you will receive the chocolate immediately.  If any
other number is drawn you will not receive the chocolate. 
[ROLL TEN-SIDED DIE FOR EACH PERSON.]
Password 7: test
This is the end of all the practices.  We will now proceed with Part II of the experiment. 
Recall that you will be asked to make choices in 4 problems, like the ones we have been
demonstrating.  Each of these four decision problems may consist of up to three levels of tables to
fill in.  After you have completed all 4 problems, we will perform the draws using the bingo cages to
determine your payments for this part.
Each person will have a 1-in-10 chance of receiving the money.  The selection will be done
using a ten-sided die.  If the number 0 is drawn you will receive the money at the end of the meeting. 
If any other number is drawn you will not receive the money.  All payments are made in private so
other persons will not know your decisions.
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We will first spin the bingo cage with 100 balls to determine which of the four problems we
will use for your payment. 
If the bingo ball is numbered 1 to 25, you will be paid for problem 1. 
If the bingo ball is numbered 26 to 50, you will be paid for problem 2.
If the bingo ball is numbered 51 to 75, you will be paid for problem 3.
If the bingo ball is numbered 76 to 100, you will be paid for problem 4.
[SPIN CAGE WITH 100 BALLS.]- A47 -
We will next spin the bingo cage to determine which decision rows in Level 1 and Level 2
are the binding ones for payment. 
[SPIN CAGE WITH 10 BALLS.]
[SPIN CAGE WITH 11 BALLS.]
We will next spin the bingo cage with 100 balls to determine whether Option A or Option B
will decide earnings in case you are indifferent.  A number between 1 and 50 means that A will be
chosen, and a number between 51 and 100 will mean that B is chosen. 
[SPIN CAGE WITH 100 BALLS.]
We will then spin the bingo cage with 100 balls to determine whether you will receive the
higher amount or the lower amount. 
[SPIN CAGE WITH 100 BALLS.]
Finally, we will now come around and roll the ten-sided die to determine who will receive
the money.  If the number 0 is drawn you will receive the money at the end of the meeting.  If any
other number is drawn you will not receive the money. 
[ROLL TEN-SIDED DIE FOR EACH PERSON.]
I will now come around and enter your subject ID numbers on the computers.  We will then
read through the instructions together.  Please wait for me to finish. 
[Give handouts for Part III to subjects: computer screen examples.] 
Instructions for Part III
We will now begin Part III of the experiment. 
Each person in this room will have a chance to receive an additional large sum of money.  If
you are selected to receive this sum of money, you will have a choice between two payment options;
option A or option B.  Each person will have a 1-in-10 chance of receiving the money.  The
selection will be done using a ten-sided die.  If the number 0 is drawn you will receive the money.  If
any other number is drawn you will not receive the money. 
As in Part II of the experiment, you will be asked to make a series of choices in a decision
problem which may have multiple levels.  The table shown on page 1 in the handout is an
illustration of what Level 1 of the decision problem will look like on your computer screen.  This
handout contains another screen image that we will mention later. 
This screen illustration shows ten decisions listed on the left side, in the column marked
Decision.  Each decision is a paired choice between Option A and Option B.  You will be asked to
make a choice between these two payment options in each decision row.  In this example each of
the 10 decision rows will pay $100 one month from today (option A) and $100 + $X seven months- A48 -
from today (option B), where $X differs in each decision row. 
In the table there are two columns labeled “Annual Interest Rate” and “Annual Effective Interest
Rate”.  To explain these terms, let us consider the following payoff alternative (decision row no. 4 in
the table):
Option A pays $100.00 one month from today. 
Option B pays $110.25 seven months from today.
In this example, if you choose option B you will earn an annual interest rate of 20.00% on the $100
you choose to receive 7 months from today.  Since this is compounded quarterly your annual
effective interest rate is 21.55%.  (Quarterly compounding is consistent with general banking
practices on overdraft accounts.)  The annual effective interest rate is the rate earned on the initial
balance ($100 in this example) plus interest earned on all interest accumulated in the preceding
compounding periods. 
For each decision row, you will be asked to choose Option A or Option B by clicking on the
appropriate button.  For some decision you may not care whether you receive Option A or B, in
which case you should click the button labeled “I” for “Indifference.” 
If you select Option A for all decision rows, or if you indicate Indifference for any of the
decision rows, there will be no further choices to be made by you in this problem before
determining your earnings.
If you select Option B for all decisions rows, or if you switch from Option A to Option B at
some point, we will give you a Level 2 task before determining your earnings.  The Level 2 task
involves making choices in the table illustrated on page 2 in the handout.
The Level 2 table shows you eleven other decisions listed in a similar way.  They are
arranged in the same way as the ten decisions in the Level 1 table, but they focus in on the decisions
that were made in Level 1.
Assume that someone in Level 1 has selected Option A for rows 1-5 and Option B for rows
6-10.  This means that this person prefers Option A when the annual interest rate is 25% or less, but
prefers Option B when the annual interest rate is 30% or more.  Level 2 then asks this person to
choose between Option A and Option B for annual interest rates between 25% and 30%. Thus, row
1 in Level 2 corresponds to an annual interest rate of 25%, and row 2 to an annual interest rate of
25.5%, and so on until the last row shows an annual interest rate of 30%.  Thus Level 2 just
provides more detail in the range of choices this person indicated in Level 1.
Notice that the annual interest rate in Level 1 increases by intervals of 5 percentage points, as
you move from decision row 1 to decision row 2.  The same increase in annual interest rates applies
to each row in Level 1.  Notice also that the decisions displayed in Level 2 are determined by the
row where you first choose Option B over Option A in Level 1.  Level 2 simply takes the interval
between the point where you last chose A and first chose B, and divides that interval of 5 percentage
points into 11 narrower intervals.
As you can see, you have a minimum of 10 decisions to make.  You will have 21 decisions if- A49 -
you make the kind of decision in Level 1 that moves you to Level 2.  Nevertheless, we will pay you
for only one of these decisions.  After you have made all of your choices we will again use the bingo
cage to select which decision will be used to determine your payment.  These procedures will work
in exactly the same way as in Part II of the experiment. 
There is one final detail we need to explain.  You will be asked to complete six decision
problems as explained above.  These six decisions will be exactly the same except that the payment
date for Option B will differ.  Although you will complete six problems, we will not pay you for all
six problems.  After you have completed the entire set of decision problems we will need to spin the
bingo cage with 6 balls numbered from 1 to 6 to determine which of the problems we will use for
your payment. 
Once we have selected that problem, we will then spin the bingo cages as explained above. 
It is important to understand that you will have to finish making your choices for all six
problems before we start spinning the bingo cages.  In addition, for each of the six decision
problems there may be up to three levels of tables rather than just two levels. 
HOW WILL YOU BE PAID?
You will receive a certificate which is redeemable under the conditions dictated by your
chosen payment option under the selected payoff alternative.  This certificate is issued by the
Ministry of Economic and Business Affairs and guarantees that the money is automatically
transported from the Ministry’s bank account in Sydbank to your personal bank account.  You can
send the certificate to Sydbank in a prepaid envelope, and the bank will handle the administration of
the money transports.  Please note that all payments are subject to personal income tax, and
information on all payments to participants will be given to the tax authorities by the Ministry of
Economic and Business Affairs. 
We will now proceed with Part III of the experiment.  Recall that you will be asked to make
choices in six problems, like the one we have demonstrated.  In each of the six problems you may
have up to three levels of tables to fill in.  After you have completed all six problems, we will
perform the draws using the bingo cages to determine your payments for this part. 
Each person will have a 1-in-10 chance of receiving the money.  The selection will be done
using a ten-sided die.  If the number 0 is drawn you will receive the money at the agreed date.  If any
other number is drawn you will not receive the money.  All payments are made in private so other
persons will not know your decisions.  
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We will first spin the bingo cage with 6 balls to determine which of the six problems we will
use for your payment.  
[SPIN CAGE WITH 6 BALLS.]
We will next spin the bingo cage to determine which decision rows in Level 1, Level 2 and
Level 3 are the binding ones for payment. 
[SPIN CAGE WITH 10 BALLS.]
[SPIN CAGE WITH 11 BALLS.]
[SPIN CAGE WITH 11 BALLS.]
We will next spin the bingo cage with 100 balls to determine whether Option A or Option B
will decide earnings in case you are indifferent.  A number between 1 and 50 means that A will be
chosen, and a number between 51 and 100 will mean that B is chosen. 
[SPIN CAGE WITH 100 BALLS.]
Finally, we will now come around and roll the ten-sided die to determine who will receive
the money.  If the number 0 is drawn you will receive the money at the agreed date.  If any other
number is drawn you will not receive the money. 
[ROLL TEN-SIDED DIE FOR EACH PERSON.]
Password 10: idr
At this time we ask that you answer the questions for Part IV.  This information is for our
records only and confidentiality of your responses is assured.  Just click the OK button to go on. 
This is the end of the survey.  When everyone has answered the questions, we will ask you to
step aside for a moment and then call you back in, one at a time, to pay you in private. 
Thank you for participating in the survey.- A51 -
Appendix D:  Data and Statistical Analysis
Supporting data and instructions are stored at the Web-Lab Experimental Social Sciences
Digital Archive (WESDA), located at http://weblab.bus.ucf.edu.  These data will be available as
soon as Rutström has re-located to the University of Central Florida and re-located the Archive; this
will probably be in late August 2003.  In the meantime, contact Glenn Harrison at
gharrison@bus.ucf.edu for electronic access to the data. In this appendix we document the structure
of the statistical code and data files.
All of the statistical analyses are undertaken using version 8 of Stata, documented in
StataCorp [2003].  The command file dk.do implements the analyses, and is as follows:
/* dk.do evaluates the 2003 Danish experiments */




* define if we use sample weights in estimation or inferences about
means (y or n)
global weighE "n"
global weighI "y"
* get the raw data
do DKdata
* evaluate the RA response
do DKra
* evaluate the IDR response
do DKidr
* compare the RA and IDR responses
do DKcompare
The data are read in using the DKdata.do command file, and the later command files undertake the
statistical analyses and generate all graphs.  The data for each subject is stored in a sub-directory
called “raw,” and consists of text files for each subject and session.  This sub-directory should be
“under” the directory in which dk.do is executed.  The data for the sample is stored in a sub-
directory called “sample.” We cannot provide the underlying sample of 25,000 Danes drawn from
the Civil registration Office because it contains personal identifiers, such as name and address.
All output is to the text file dk.log.  Data files are saved to version 7 of Stata, which can be
read by version 8.  Since we use Stata/SE, all files are also saved to the smaller Intercooled version of
Stata, which is more widely used.